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A FAUSTIAN BARGAIN THAT UNDERMINES RESEARCH 
PARTICIPANTS’ PRIVACY RIGHTS AND RETURN OF RESULTS 
Barbara J. Evans* and Susan M. Wolf **  
Abstract 
A 2018 committee report published by the highly respected National 
Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (the Report) 
recommends stripping research participants of crucial data privacy rights 
and discarding decades of carefully deliberated consensus guidelines for 
the ethical return of results and data from research. This Article traces 
these disturbing recommendations to three root causes: (1) a statement of 
task that blocked careful and impartial analysis of a disputed legal matter 
central to the Report; (2) a piecemeal legal analysis that omitted relevant 
strands of law; and (3) the inappropriate conflation of two distinct 
concepts—the return of individual research results (the stated subject of 
the Report) and privacy-enabling individual access rights, which have a 
nearly fifty-year legal history long predating the modern debate about 
return of results. The Report’s recommendations would erect new barriers 
to the return of results and, simultaneously, dial back a core data privacy 
right that Americans—including many research participants—currently 
enjoy. We urge extreme caution in implementing this Report’s flawed 
recommendations. Congress has elevated the right to see one’s personal 
information to the status of a civil right in many different data 
environments. Diminishing individual access in the research context 
erodes its status as a right more broadly. 
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Faustian bargain: a pact whereby a person trades 
something of supreme moral or spiritual importance, such 
as personal values or the soul, for some worldly or material 
benefit, such as knowledge, power, or riches. . . . Faustian 
bargains are by their nature tragic or self-defeating for the 
person who makes them, because what is surrendered is 
ultimately far more valuable than what is obtained, whether 
or not the bargainer appreciates that fact.1 
INTRODUCTION: AN ASSAULT ON LONGSTANDING RIGHTS  
TO SEE ONE’S OWN DATA 
For nearly fifty years, federal, state, and global lawmakers have 
created rights to access one’s own data as a crucial dimension of privacy 
rights.2 Without the ability to access your data, you cannot spot errors, 
assess the privacy threat posed by circulation of those data, or determine 
whether to consent to sharing and secondary uses. In the United States, 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)3 
Privacy Rule4 has applied this access right to health information, 
including research-generated information, for nearly two decades.5 Yet it 
continues to meet resistance, motivating some states to threaten (and 
some to enact) data-ownership statutes.6   
Meanwhile, on a separate track, commentators since at least 19807 
have urged that researchers offer to share with research participants their 
individual-specific research results and incidental findings in the ethical 
conduct of research, with endorsement of this practice in consensus 
reports since 1999.8 While the appropriate scope of return has been 
debated, the basic importance of return of results and incidental or 
secondary findings is now widely recognized, funded by the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) in many studies, and globally practiced.9 
However, this too continues to meet resistance.  
                                                                                                                 
 1. Faustian Bargain, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (emphasis added), 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Faustian-bargain [https://perma.cc/SG95-TUM3]. 
 2. See infra Section II.B. 
 3. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 4. See 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164 (2018). 
 5. See infra Section II.B. 
 6. See infra note 14. 
 7. See Philip Reilly, When Should an Investigator Share Raw Data with the Subjects?, 
IRB, Nov. 1980, at  4, 5. 
 8. See NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN BIOLOGICAL 
MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE 71–72 (1999). For discussion of subsequent 
consensus recommendations, see infra text accompanying note 68.  
 9. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
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Both of these domains raise questions of science, medicine, law, and 
ethics. Progress requires rigorous analysis on all fronts. Yet progress is 
now endangered by a 2018 report from the National Academies of 
Science, Engineering, and Medicine (the Report).10 The Academies, a 
prestigious and highly influential body that has advised the federal 
government since the Civil War,11 convened a committee to analyze and 
issue recommendations on return of results and individual access to data. 
In a stunning departure from the usually excellent quality of Academies 
reports, this Report failed to provide a thorough legal analysis, thus 
dooming the Report’s many legal and regulatory recommendations. 
Worse, the Report conflated the legally separate domains of HIPAA 
access and return of results. The damage and danger are real. At a time 
of great progress toward transparency in research, partnership with 
research participants, and true engagement with research participant 
communities, the Report threatens to turn back the clock, endangering 
long-established privacy rights and stalling return of results.  
In the domain of privacy, not only has the Report recommended that 
regulators gut current privacy rights, but the Report adds fuel to a highly 
problematic movement to grant individuals ownership rights in their own 
data—a change that would endanger biomedical research and progress. 
The metaphor of individual data ownership persists in popular discourse 
about research ethics and data privacy12 despite fairly wide scholarly 
agreement that data ownership has serious conceptual and practical 
flaws.13 A few states recognize property rights14 or have considered doing 
                                                                                                                 
 10. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., RETURNING INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH RESULTS 
TO PARTICIPANTS: GUIDANCE FOR A NEW RESEARCH PARADIGM (Jeffrey R. Botkin et al. eds., 2018) 
[hereinafter REPORT]. 
 11. See History of the National Academies, NAT’L ACADS. SCI., ENGINEERING, & MED., 
http://www.nationalacademies.org/about/history/index.html [https://perma.cc/EA2B-PBFD].  
 12. See Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L. 
REV. 135, 141 (2004) (noting that references to ownership “will likely stick” in public discourse 
about data privacy, because the concept of property is widely familiar to people and captures 
aspirations people harbor about being able to control access to their data).  
 13. See, e.g., Amy L. McGuire et al., Who Owns the Data in a Medical Information 
Commons?, 47 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 62, 62–63 (2019) (discussing practical and legal pros and cons 
of individual data ownership).  
 14. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010(a)(2) (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-
1104.7(1)(a) (2018); FLA. STAT. § 760.40(2)(a) (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1(1) (2018); see 
also Seth Axelrad, State Statutes Declaring Genetic Information to be Personal Property, 
http://www.aslme.org/dna_04/reports/axelrad4.pdf  [https://perma.cc/3DSY-NSX7] (discussing 
state data ownership statutes). 
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so15 for certain kinds of data, most notably genetic information.16 At the 
federal level, however, Congress rejected data ownership as a tool for 
privacy protection almost fifty years ago17 and instead embraced a civil 
rights model of data privacy.18 Instead of declaring that people own their 
data and letting courts elaborate the rights and duties ownership entails, 
Congress has tried to enunciate a core set of rights people should have 
when their personal data are stored, used, and shared by others.19  
These rights are created by federal privacy statutes, such as the 
Privacy Act of 1974,20 and by privacy regulations Congress authorized 
when passing other statutes such as HIPAA and the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA).21 In many respects, they resemble the 
same “bundle of sticks”22 people would have if they owned their data23 
                                                                                                                 
 15. See, e.g., H.B. 1220, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015); H.B. 1260, 87th Leg. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2012); H.B. 2110, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011). 
 16. See, e.g., Jennifer K. Wagner & Dan Vorhaus, On Genetic Rights and States: A Look at 
South Dakota and Around the U.S., PRIVACY REP. (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.genomics 
lawreport.com/index.php/2012/03/20/on-genetic-rights-and-states-a-look-at-south-dakota-and-
around-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/JX9U-NJ97] (discussing genetic data ownership laws). 
 17. See infra notes 125–26 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s finding that the 
federal Privacy Act enables the exercise of constitutionally protected civil rights). 
 18. See Barbara J. Evans, HIPAA’s Individual Right of Access to Genomic Data: 
Reconciling Safety and Civil Rights, 102 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 5, 5–6 (2018); Kathy L. Hudson 
et al., Keeping Pace with the Times—The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 
358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2661, 2662 (2008) (characterizing the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 as civil rights legislation); see also George J. Annas et al., GINA, 
Genism, and Civil Rights, 22 BIOETHICS ii, iii (2008) (“Senator Judd Gregg has termed GINA ‘the 
first civil rights bill of the 21st Century,’ a phrase often quoted by the Senate's main sponsor of 
the bill, Senator Olympia Snow and others, and endorsed by the American Civil Liberties Union 
as well.”). There is a long history of using medical research generally and genetics specifically as 
instruments of discrimination by race and ethnicity. See generally DOROTHY ROBERTS, FATAL 
INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG BUSINESS RE-CREATE RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY (2012); HARRIET A. WASHINGTON, MEDICAL APARTHEID: THE DARK HISTORY OF 
MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION ON BLACK AMERICANS FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 
(2006). For a recent report from China showing the importance of access to one’s own research 
data and results in order to protect against discrimination and abuse, see Sui-Lee Wee, China Uses 
DNA to Track Its People, With the Help of American Expertise, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/business/china-xinjiang-uighur-dna-thermo-fisher.html 
[https://perma.cc/ASM5-8VSN]. 
 19. See infra notes 125–26 and accompanying text (discussing the enacted findings of fact 
Congress included in the Privacy Act of 1974). 
 20. Pub. L. No. 93–579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012)). 
 21. Pub. L. 110–233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 
& 42 U.S.C.). 
 22. See Jessica L. Roberts, Progressive Genetic Ownership, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1105, 
1129 (2018) (tracing the history of the “bundle of sticks” characterization of the set of entitlements 
that ownership provides). 
 23. Barbara J. Evans, Much Ado About Data Ownership, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 69, 74 
(2011) (noting that HIPAA’s privacy rights are “strikingly similar” to rights inherent in 
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but, technically, they are federal civil rights instead of ownership rights. 
With this artful strategy, Congress was able to provide a federal floor of 
privacy protections that somewhat resemble data ownership, without 
inviting challenges by declaring people “owners” of their own data and 
without encroaching on the states’ traditional prerogative to establish the 
limits of property law and regulate relationships such as those between 
individuals and health care institutions.24  
One of the privacy rights Congress has consistently protected, dating 
back to the early 1970s, is the individual’s right of access to one’s own 
data—that is, a right for people to inspect and receive copies of personal 
information that others are storing, using, and disclosing about them.25 
Individual control, rather than secrecy, is central to the modern paradigm 
of data privacy,26 and people obviously have no control if they cannot 
even see what their data contain or gain access to their records. Privacy-
related access mimics the right of ingress that inheres in property 
ownership—a right to enter and inspect one’s property.   
Some data holders, for various reasons, resist having to provide this 
access, and individual access rights are not always vigorously enforced.27  
The Academies’ Report observed that providing individual access to data 
and results at research laboratories is burdensome for researchers and 
might reduce their productivity.28 The Report stresses that funds for 
biomedical research “are precious and require careful and responsible 
stewardship,” so that letting participants have data access “necessarily 
                                                                                                                 
ownership). See generally Roberts, supra note 22 (characterizing privacy-related access rights as 
functionally similar to ownership interests). 
 24. As discussed above, a few states have created property rights in certain types of data 
such as genetic information. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 22, at 1128 n.160 (listing five states—
Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana that treat genetic information as the property 
of the person the data describe); id. at 1128 n.161 (listing states that have considered genetic data 
ownership legislation); supra notes 14, 15 and accompanying text. However, many more states 
have rejected individual ownership of medical or genetic information in favor of creating strong 
individual access rights as an aspect of state privacy law. See, e.g., Individual Access to Medical 
Records: 50 State Comparison, HEALTH INFO. & L., www.healthinfolaw.org/comparative-
analysis/individual-access-medical-records-50-state-comparison [https://perma.cc/9S33-WWUP]. 
 25. See supra notes 20–24 and accompanying text. 
 26. Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 820 (2000). 
 27. See, e.g., Carolyn T. Lye et al., Assessment of U.S. Hospital Compliance with 
Regulations for Patients’ Requests for Medical Records, [J]AMA NETWORK OPEN (Oct. 5, 2018), 
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2705850 [https://perma.cc/R386-
XHG6] (providing empirical data demonstrating the difficulty individuals experience exercising 
their HIPAA access rights); see also Steven Keating, Curiosity, Serendipity, and a Brain Tumor, 
MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602914/curiosity-
serendipity-and-a-brain-tumor/ [https://perma.cc/KG6M-MLPT] (chronicling the author’s 
difficulty obtaining access to his own genomic test results from research). 
 28. REPORT, supra note 10, at 59, 73–74, 124, 165–66. 
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requires the diversion of some research resources from the primary goal 
of the research.”29 In short, honoring people’s right to see their own 
results and data generated during research is inconvenient.30  
This kind of failure to provide access enhances pressure for 
statehouses to enact data-ownership laws to give people desired control 
over their data.31 A patchwork of state data-ownership bills, if enacted, 
would strengthen individual access but could impede the availability of 
data for research and other socially beneficial uses. Attempts to weaken 
existing federal individual access rights thus invite serious unintended 
consequences for biomedical research, which increasingly relies on data 
as fuel for discovery. 
This Article explores how the Academies’ Report, which is entitled, 
“Returning Individual Results to Research Participants,”32 would affect 
research participants’ privacy rights while also undermining the ethical 
practice of returning results and data. The Academies are independent, 
private bodies that trace their lineage to a congressional charter President 
Lincoln signed in 1863.33 They appoint expert committees to conduct 
studies of policy questions that require scientific or medical insights and 
analysis.34 “The reports of the Academies are viewed as being valuable 
and credible because of the institution’s reputation for providing 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Id. at 59. 
 30. See Inconvenient, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ 
inconvenient [https://perma.cc/D8UA-A273] (defining “inconvenient” as “[c]ausing trouble, 
difficulties, or discomfort”). For an example of a regulation recognizing narrow circumstances in 
which access can be temporarily suspended, see 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(2)(iii) (2018) (noting that 
there are limited circumstances in which access can be suspended—when providing research 
participants access to their own data and results during conduct of a clinical trial could “un-blind” 
the trial and invalidate the research—and providing a narrow exception allowing access to be 
suspended temporarily during the trial and requiring access to be reinstated once the trial is 
complete). However, the Report’s argument that access is burdensome and might reduce research 
productivity is made far more broadly than this HIPAA limited exception envisions. See REPORT, 
supra note 10, at 59, 73–74, 124, 165–66. 
 31. See, e.g., Leonard J. Kish & Eric J. Topol, Unpatients—Why Patients Should Own Their 
Medical Data, 33 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 921, 922 (2015) (arguing that individual ownership 
of data would serve important interests not being served by current rights of access and control); 
Eric J. Topol, The Big Medical Data Miss: Challenges in Establishing an Open Medical Resource, 
16 NATURE REVS. 253, 253 (2015) (calling for data ownership). 
 32. See REPORT, supra note 10. 
 33. Who We Are, NAT’L ACADS. SCI., ENGINEERING, & MED., http://www.national 
academies.org/about/whoweare/index.html [https://perma.cc/9S9P-W6RJ].  
 34. See Guidelines for the Review of Reports of the National Academies of Sciences, 
Engineering, and Medicine, NAT’L ACADS. SCI., ENGINEERING, & MED., http://www.national 
academies.org/nasem/na_067075.html [https://perma.cc/VX47-QL6B] (“The rationale for any 
findings, conclusions, and recommendations should be fully explained in the report. This 
explanation might include references to the literature, analysis of data, or a description of the pros 
and cons of the range of alternatives and the reasons for preferring a particular option.”). 
1288 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71 
 
independent, objective, and nonpartisan advice with high standards of 
scientific and technical quality.”35 The Academies describe themselves as 
“the nation’s pre-eminent source of high-quality, objective advice on 
science, engineering, and health matters.”36 
The sponsor of a study—often a federal agency—works with the 
Academies to agree on a statement of task (SOT) that defines the scope 
of work.37 “Most studies are funded by those requesting the advice,” with 
costs ranging “from about $200,000 to more than $1 million,” which is 
free of any fees for the subject-matter experts serving on the study 
committee, because they volunteer their time.38 The majority of studies 
are paid for by federal agencies.39   
The Academies generally follow a policy of self-imposed restraint 
when recommending changes to federal statutes and regulations. The 
Academies’ criteria for reports thus state that recommendations calling 
for the adoption of specific legislation are “[o]f particular concern” and 
“should be avoided unless specifically called for in the study charge.”40 
This approach displays respect for the rule of law and for the 
Constitution, which entrusts Congress—and the agencies Congress 
authorizes—to make our federal laws and regulations.  
When a study addresses legal questions, the Academies’ “high 
standards of . . . technical quality”41 demand the same excellence that the 
Academies require when analyzing questions of science, engineering, 
and medicine. This means that reports discussing the law should meet 
legal professional standards. Those standards require accurate statements 
of law based on thorough legal research,42 not just when representing 
clients in a practice setting, but also when providing “law-related 
                                                                                                                 
 35. See Our Study Process, NAT’L ACADS. SCI., ENGINEERING, & MED., 
http://www.nationalacademies.org/nasem/na_064188.html [https://perma.cc/AL6W-GW9N]. 
 36. See What We Do, NAT’L ACADS. SCI., ENGINEERING, & MED., http://www.national 
academies.org/about/whatwedo/index.html [https://perma.cc/V4BA-N6J5].  
 37. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., WORKING WITH THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES: A 
GUIDE FOR PROSPECTIVE STUDY SPONSORS (n.d.), http://www.nationalacademies.org/site_assets/ 
groups/nasite/documents/webpage/na_069619.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AR9-AUW8].  
 38. Id.  
 39. See Our Study Process, supra note 35; see also NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., 
2017 REPORT TO CONGRESS 59 (2017) (showing 78% federal funding of the Academies’ studies 
in 2017, the latest year available). 
 40. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., 2017 REPORT TO CONGRESS 59 (2017) (“Of 
particular concern are recommendations calling for organizational changes or budgetary increases 
within government agencies, for adoption of specific legislation . . . .”). 
 41.  See Our Study Process, supra note 35. 
 42. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1, 4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (explaining 
the requirements for diligent research and accuracy in the delivery of professional legal services). 
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services”43 such as writing scholarly articles or National Academies 
reports.  
Something went off track in the Academies’ Report on return of 
results. The three sponsoring agencies44 for the Report were NIH, the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS), which administers the Clinical Laboratory 
Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA)45 regulations that promote 
the safety of laboratory tests used in clinical care.46 The Report focuses 
on questions raised by return of individual research results to people 
participating in studies that involve analysis of biospecimens47 — in other 
words, studies that include laboratory tests of people’s blood or tissue 
samples.48  
This Report deviates from the Academies’ own standards of quality, 
restraint in legal recommendations, and respect for the rule of law. It is 
full of legal content and makes multiple legal recommendations and thus 
needed to meet the professional standards for legal analysis. Yet it makes 
statements about federal law that prove false when subjected even to 
cursory legal research.49 The SOT expressly instructs the committee not 
to propose any amendments to the CLIA statute,50 yet the Report 
recommends CLIA regulatory changes that appear unlawful unless 
Congress amends the CLIA statute.51 A rudimentary requirement of legal 
due diligence is to vet any proposed regulatory changes to make sure they 
would not violate current statutes. However, there is no sign this vetting 
occurred: some recommendations press agencies to take actions beyond 
their statutory authority, while others awkwardly call for regulations to 
be amended to do things the regulations already do.52 The Report even 
presumes to advise one agency—the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services’ (HHS) Office for Civil Rights (OCR), which holds the 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Id. at r. 5.7 (explaining professional responsibilities when delivering law-related 
services). 
 44. See REPORT, supra note 10, at 2. 
 45. Pub. L. No. 100-578, 102 Stat. 2903 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 263a (2012)). 
 46. See 42 C.F.R. pt. 493 (2018). 
 47. See REPORT, supra note 10, at 7–8 (conceiving “research results” broadly as including 
results of the research analysis, incidental or secondary findings, as well as raw data such as 
genomic sequences generated during a study); id. at 8 (defining individual research results as 
results that “are specific to one participant” as opposed—for example—to aggregate results that 
describe a group of study participants). 
 48. See id. at 2, 7 (providing examples of research studies that are within the Report’s 
scope).  
 49. See infra Parts III–V.  
 50. REPORT, supra note 10, at 9 (“[T]he committee was not asked to make recommendations 
to Congress regarding changes to the CLIA law.”). 
 51. See infra notes 370–83 and accompanying text. 
 52. See infra Part V.  
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delegated authority53 to administer the HIPAA Privacy Rule54—to scale 
back one of HIPAA’s core privacy protections,55 even though OCR was 
not a study sponsor and the Report provides little evidence that OCR was 
consulted.56  
The Report “achieved consensus on a number of core issues” 
including a claimed need to “transition away from firm rules, such as 
those embodied in . . . the [HIPAA] regulations, that stipulate when 
[laboratory test] results must or cannot be disclosed toward a process-
based approach.”57 The “firm rules” in question include U.S. federal laws, 
which the Report airily recommends our nation should “transition away 
from.”58  
Part I of this Article asks how this happened. We trace the core 
problem to the Report’s SOT, which incorporated a disputed legal 
position advanced by CMS, one of the agencies sponsoring the Report. 
The SOT recited this position as if it were an established legal truth and 
instructed the committee not to examine the CLIA statute59 (which, had 
it been examined, proves otherwise). Working with sponsor-imposed 
legal “blinders” on, the Report made two assumptions about federal law: 
first, that the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s individual access right60 is in conflict 
with the CLIA regulations,61 so that research laboratories will violate 
CLIA if they comply with HIPAA62 and, second, that the CLIA 
                                                                                                                 
 53. See Delegation of Authority to OCR to Implement/Enforce HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/ 
delegation-of-authority/index.html [https://perma.cc/SQ3X-8Y3P] (citing Statement of 
Delegation of Authority, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,381 (Dec. 28, 2000)); see also Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 105(b), 122 Stat. 881, 905 (delegating 
responsibility to implement GINA’s privacy mandate to HHS and, by implication, to OCR based 
on the earlier subdelegation of HHS’s HIPAA responsibilities to OCR). 
 54. 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164 (2018). 
 55. See REPORT, supra note 10, at 269–70 (calling on the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) to 
revise its HIPAA regulations); discussion infra Section IV.B (discussing the impact of these 
proposed changes). 
 56. See REPORT, supra note 10, app. at 279–87 (not mentioning OCR as a source of input); 
id. app. at 289–94 (not listing OCR as having provided input during Public Sessions); id. app. at 
311 n.106 (citing a conversation with a former OCR official who was no longer employed by the 
agency at the time of writing, but citing no contact with currently serving OCR officials).  
 57. Id. at x. 
 58. Id.  
 59. See discussion infra Part I. 
 60. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2018) (providing an individual right to inspect and receive 
copies of certain data stored by HIPAA-covered facilities). 
 61. 42 C.F.R. pt. 493.  
 62. See REPORT, supra note 10, at 1–2 (“Recent significant changes to federal regulations 
have promoted transparency and allowed individuals greater access to their clinical and research 
test results. These changes include the elimination of the laboratory exclusion from the [HIPAA] 
privacy rule and revisions to the Common Rule that require prospective participants to be told 
2019] A FAUSTIAN BARGAIN 1291 
 
regulations more broadly bar any reporting of individual-specific 
research results by non-CLIA-certified research laboratories,63 including 
established ethical practices such as the return of results and data from 
research. This Article subjects these assumptions to the analysis that the 
Academies’ committee was ordered not to provide. Neither assumption 
withstands legal scrutiny.  
Part II of this Article disentangles two concepts that the Report 
improperly conflated. The first is privacy-related individual access rights, 
such as those protected by the HIPAA Privacy Rule,64 the federal Privacy 
Act,65 various state privacy laws,66 and the privacy laws of other 
jurisdictions such as the European Union.67 The second is the return of 
an individual’s research results as elaborated in the bioethics and 
scientific literature and in consensus guidelines developed and widely 
applied over the past twenty years.68 These concepts do have a superficial 
                                                                                                                 
during the consent process whether clinically relevant individual research results will be returned. 
On the other hand, the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA) bars 
laboratories that are not CLIA certified from reporting individual research results. This creates a 
dilemma . . . .”); id. at 28 (referring to “[t]he current absolute prohibition of the return of results 
from non-CLIA-certified laboratories”); id. at 250 tbl.6-2 (stating that a non-CLIA-certified 
laboratory has a “[l]egal obligation[]” to make “[m]andatory disclosure under HIPAA (but act of 
disclosure then requires laboratory to become CLIA certified”)—in other words, the required act 
of providing access to data under HIPAA will trigger CLIA jurisdiction for laboratories that would 
not otherwise be subject to the CLIA regulations). But see id. app. at 315 tbl.C-4 (including, in a 
similar statement by the Committee’s legal consultant, an important proviso that this statement 
was true “according to CMS”—a proviso that does not appear in the Report’s version of the table 
at 250 tbl.6-2). 
 63. See id. at 28 (referring to “[t]he current absolute prohibition of the return of results from 
non-CLIA-certified laboratories”). 
 64. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.524. 
 65. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896.  
 66. See, e.g., California Consumer Privacy Act, 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. 3 (West) (“[I]t is the 
intent of the Legislature to further Californians’ right to privacy by giving consumers an effective 
way to control their personal information, by ensuring the following rights[, including] . . . [t]he 
right of Californians to access their personal information.”); id. at 3–4 (amending Part 4 of 
Division 3 of the Civil Code to add § 1798.100(d), which provides individuals with a right of 
access to their data). 
 67. See, e.g., Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data 
and on the Free Movement of Such Data and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, art. 15, 2016 O.J. (L 
119) 1, 43. 
 68. See, e.g., NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 8 (presenting 
recommendations from a presidential commission); Ebony B. Bookman et al., Reporting Genetic 
Results in Research Studies: Summary and Recommendations of an NHLBI Working Group, 140 
AM. J. MED. GENETICS PART A 1033, 1033 (2006) (presenting a set of consensus guidelines);  
Susan M. Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research:  Analysis and 
Recommendations, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 219, 219, 242 (2008) [hereinafter Wolf et al., 
Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research] (same); Timothy Caulfield et al., 
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similarity: both have the effect of placing individual test results and data 
into research participants’ hands. This similarity invites authors—
including us at times69—to discuss the two in one breath. Here, however, 
we stress that they are distinct concepts, with different legal histories and 
rationales that the Academies’ Report failed to acknowledge. This 
omission, we argue, contributed to a legally flawed set of 
recommendations.   
Part III supplies necessary background on the CLIA statute and 
regulations—admittedly a dry topic but one that crucially affects research 
participants’ privacy and ethical rights in research involving laboratory 
testing. Part IV critiques CMS’s position regarding its jurisdiction to 
regulate research laboratories under CLIA. Specifically, is the CMS 
position a permissible interpretation of the CLIA regulations and does it 
warrant deference? We conclude the answers are “no” and “no.” Part V 
explains why the Report’s starting assumptions about HIPAA access and 
the return of results were flawed and then explores how these erroneous 
assumptions produced problematic recommendations.   
What emerges is that the Academies’ Report proposes a sweeping 
program of regulatory reforms to resolve a presumed regulatory conflict 
that actually never existed. The Report proclaims support for the ideal of 
greater participant access to results and data, while recommending 
policies that would constrict and delay that access. This contradiction 
may confuse readers on first exposure to this Report. However, careful 
analysis requires going beyond the Report’s rhetoric to its actual 
recommendations. The Report champions greater respect for people who 
participate in research by calling them “research ‘participants,’ rather 
than research ‘subjects,’”70 yet its recommendations fail to trust these 
people by protecting their access to their own personal information. The 
                                                                                                                 
Research Ethics Recommendations for Whole-Genome Research: Consensus Statement, 6 PLOS 
BIOLOGY 430, 432–33 (2008) (same); Richard R. Fabsitz et al., Ethical and Practical Guidelines 
for Reporting Genetic Research Results to Study Participants: Updated Guidelines from a 
National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute Working Group, 3 CIRCULATION CARDIOVASCULAR 
GENETICS 574, 574 (2010) (same); Susan M. Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings and 
Research Results in Genomic Research Involving Biobanks and Archived Data Sets, 14 GENET. 
MED. 361, 361, 363 (2012) [hereinafter Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings and Research 
Results in Biobanks] (same); Gail P. Jarvik et al., Return of Genomic Results to Research 
Participants: The Floor, the Ceiling, and the Choices in Between, 94 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 818, 
818 (2014) (same); Susan M. Wolf et al., Returning a Research Participant’s Genomic Results to 
Relatives: Analysis and Recommendations, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 440, 440 (2015) [hereinafter 
Wolf et al., Returning Genomic Results to Relatives] (same). 
 69. See Susan M. Wolf & Barbara J. Evans, Return of Results and Data to Study 
Participants, 362 SCI. 159, 160 (2018) [hereinafter Wolf & Evans, Return of Results]; Susan M. 
Wolf & Barbara J. Evans, Defending the Return of Results and Data, 362 SCI. 1255, 1256 (2018) 
[hereinafter Wolf & Evans, Defending Return of Results].  
 70. REPORT, supra note 10, at 269.  
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Report urges stripping research participants of established privacy and 
ethical rights.  
The Academies’ Report on return of results struck a Faustian 
bargain.71 It analyzed a problem under terms that traded away something 
of supreme importance—the Academies’ 150-year tradition of 
independence, objectivity, and high standards of technical quality72—and 
doomed the Report’s legal and policy recommendations. 
I.  A TROUBLING STATEMENT OF TASK 
The Report’s SOT states: “Currently, any research laboratory that 
returns individual-specific research results is regulated by CLIA.”73 This 
statement assigns controlling weight not to a statute or regulation, but 
rather to a strange and highly controversial position CMS announced in 
a lowly PDF file74 posted unsigned on its website on or about December 
2014.75 According to this position, research laboratories cannot report 
individual-specific results unless the results meet clinical standards of 
quality76— which, according to the PDF file, means that the laboratory 
must comply77 with CLIA. The Report wrongly characterizes this PDF 
position as a CMS “interpretation” of the CLIA regulations,78 seemingly 
unaware that “interpretation” is a legal term of art. Not every opinion or 
position put forth by a federal agency is a permissible interpretation of 
                                                                                                                 
 71. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 72. See Our Study Process, supra note 35. 
 73. REPORT, supra note 10, at 5 box S-2 (reciting the Report’s statement of task). 
 74. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Research Testing and Clinical Laboratory 
Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA) Regulations, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/CLIA/Downloads/Research-
Testing-and-CLIA.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XBH-SUXP]. 
 75. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/CLIA/index. 
html?redirect=/CLIA/ [https://perma.cc/9ENV-ZNZL]. 
 76. See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 74. 
 77. This Article uses the term “CLIA-compliant” to refer, jointly, to two types of 
laboratories: (1) laboratories that comply with CLIA by obtaining a CLIA certificate (CLIA-
certified laboratories), and (2) laboratories that are CLIA-exempt as a result of being licensed by 
a state whose laboratory requirements CMS has determined are equal to or more stringent than 
CLIA’s requirements, and the state licensure program has been approved by CMS. Two states—
New York and Washington—currently meet those conditions.  List of Exempt States Under the 
Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/CLIA/Downloads/Exempt 
StatesList.pdf [https://perma.cc/2G59-HW5G]. CLIA-exempt laboratories comply with CLIA by 
complying with their relevant state-licensing requirements. See id. 
 78. REPORT, supra note 10, at 28 (“CMS’s interpretation of CLIA blocks any laboratory 
from returning a test result if the laboratory is not CLIA certified . . . .”). 
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the law. We explain how CMS’s position contradicts the clear79 
jurisdictional language of the CLIA statute80 and is inconsistent with the 
plain text of the CLIA regulations.81 Nevertheless, the SOT recites it as 
an established legal truth.82  
The Report admits that CMS’s position is legally controversial, but 
credits it without any analysis.83 The SOT required this approach, 
insisting that the committee “not provide any legal interpretation or 
analysis regarding the scope or applicability of CLIA.”84 This barred the 
committee from conducting elementary legal research—such as checking 
what the relevant statute says—that would have readily revealed the error 
in the SOT.85  
The Report recounts how “[t]he sponsors indicated to the committee 
that it would be appropriate to include in its description of the current 
regulatory environment for the return of individual research results 
CMS’s current interpretation of the scope and applicability of CLIA.”86 
This was an instruction for the committee to take sides in a legal dispute 
by describing a contested agency position about the law (the PDF 
position) as if it really were the law. Accordingly, the Report, in places, 
ceases to characterize CMS’s position as a disputed agency assertion and 
instead repeats that position, in the committee’s own voice, as a firm 
declaration of legal truth.87 Doing so lends the Academies’ reputation to 
an unexamined and, it turns out, legally flawed assertion.  
                                                                                                                 
 79. See Regulations Implementing the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 
1988 (CLIA), 57 Fed. Reg. 7002, 7011 (Feb. 28, 1992) (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 
C.F.R.) (determining, in a notice and comment proceeding conducted by the Health Care 
Financing Administration (HCFA), which was the former name for the agency now known as 
CMS, that “CLIA clearly defines the type of facility subject to regulation”). 
 80. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a) (2012). 
 81. See discussion infra Parts III and IV; see also Sec’y’s Advisory Comm. on Human 
Research Prots., Attachment C: Return of Individual Results and Special Consideration of Issues 
Arising from Amendments of HIPAA and CLIA, HHS.GOV, www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sachrp-committee/ 
recommendations/2015-september-28-attachment-c/index.html [https://perma.cc/KJ26-CL5C] 
(finding the CMS position “at odds with the plain language of the [CLIA] regulation”). 
 82. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993) (“As we have often stated, provided 
an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations does not violate the Constitution or a federal 
statute, it must be given ‘controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.’” (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945))); see also 
1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.4 (5th ed. 2010) (“Stinson is 
consistent with many opinions issued both before and after Stinson.”).  
 83. See REPORT, supra note 10, at 9 (noting that legal scholars question this interpretation). 
 84. Id. at 7 box S-2 (quoting the statement of task). 
 85. Id. at 9 (“[T]he committee was advised that making any comments, analysis, or 
conclusions regarding the appropriateness of that [CMS] interpretation would be beyond what 
was intended in the Statement of Task.”). 
 86. Id. 
 87. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
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The Report’s SOT is the legal equivalent of having a sponsor instruct 
the Academies to conduct a scientific study that assumes Π=6 (instead of 
3.14159265359 . . .),88 and without asking any questions. It might be 
appropriate in some circumstances for a study to examine a 
counterfactual hypothetical, if it is consistently described as a 
hypothetical. For example, a report by the Academies could conceivably 
state:  
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) is planning a mission to a distant galaxy where 
circles are not round and the usual laws of physics do not 
hold. Accordingly, NASA has engaged the Academies to 
advise NASA how to operate in an environment where Π=6. 
The Academies have agreed to perform this study but take 
no position on whether Π=6.  
It is a different matter for study sponsors to instruct a committee of 
the Academies to “include in its description” of the truth a federal 
agency’s disputed version of the truth, without “making any comments, 
analysis, or conclusions regarding the appropriateness of that 
interpretation.”89 That is what the Academies agreed to do in this Report.  
For the Academies to agree to include an agency’s disputed views in 
the Academies’ own “description of the current regulatory 
environment,”90 with no fact-checking, makes the Academies a captive 
mouthpiece for a federal agency under fire. Seemingly, all an embattled 
agency would need to do in order to advance its version of disputed law 
or facts would be to enter into a contract with the Academies and set 
ground rules requiring a report to treat the agency’s side of the dispute as 
reality. An agency could, for example, instruct the Academies to publish 
a report that “include[s] in its description”91 that climate change is not 
real, that smoking does not cause cancer, that nobody in America suffers 
from hunger or substandard health care, that endangered species are 
thriving, or that the First Amendment does not protect the freedom of 
religion. These may seem far-fetched fodder for future Academies 
reports, but that reaction underscores the importance of scrutinizing the 
terms an agency imposes. Accepting agency positions and writing them 
into a committee’s consensus report risks allowing the Academies’ 
                                                                                                                 
 88. See Sarah Jacobsson Purewal, A Brief History of Pi, PCWORLD (Mar. 13, 2013, 3:28 
PM), https://www.pcworld.com/article/191389/a-brief-history-of-pi.html [https://perma.cc/ 
F88A-47CA] (explaining that Pi, also denoted Π, is the ratio of a circle’s circumference to its 
diameter). 
 89. REPORT, supra note 10, at 9. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id.  
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reputation for rigor and independence to be diluted and used to advance 
contested agency agendas. The potential for mischief is real, especially 
in an age pundits have christened the “post-truth era.”92  
The Academies’ agreement to conduct a study on these terms is 
concerning, as is the fact that this study proceeded to completion under 
these strictures. The Academies have procedures in place to correct an 
SOT that a committee, once it starts work, determines is inadequate.93 
Still, the portrait that emerges here is of a sincere and hard-working 
committee saddled with a deeply troubling SOT. Going forward, the 
Academies should be very reluctant to bind a committee to a sponsoring 
agency’s account of the law, especially when that account is mired in 
known controversy.94 The Academies’ well-earned reputation for 
rigorous analysis should extend to its legal analysis, not just medicine and 
science.  
II.  DISTINGUISHING HIPAA DATA ACCESS FROM THE 
RETURN OF RESULTS 
Privacy-related individual access rights, such as the rights central to 
the HIPAA Privacy Rule,95 arguably were beyond the scope of the 
Academies’ Report. The Report’s stated subject matter, as indicated in its 
title, was the return of individual research results. The Report dragged 
HIPAA’s access right into its scope by accepting CMS’s position that 
CLIA prohibits the return of results from non-CLIA-certified research 
laboratories; this seems to imply that CLIA also prohibits HIPAA 
access.96 The reality is more complicated. HIPAA’s access right differs 
from the return of results in terms of its history and legal basis, its 
rationale and purposes, the scope of data disclosure to fulfill those 
purposes, its administration and enforceability, and the customs and 
                                                                                                                 
 92. See, e.g., Chris Hayes, Chris Hayes Reviews Michiko Kakutani’s Book about our Post-
Truth Era, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/18/books/review/ 
michiko-kakutani-death-of-truth.html [https://perma.cc/GN9X-MDA3]. 
 93. See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., GETTING TO KNOW THE COMMITTEE 
PROCESS 5 (2005), http://www.nationalacademies.org/site_assets/groups/nasite/documents/web 
page/na_069620.pdf [https://perma.cc/JMN2-8WA6] (“The charge to the committee—developed 
before committee members are selected—is the formal statement of the questions to be addressed 
by the study. This statement defines the study’s scope and issues to be examined. If a committee 
finds in the course of its work that this description is inadequate, the charge can be formally 
modified through petition to the Executive Committee of the National Research Council’s 
Governing Board.”). 
 94. REPORT, supra note 10, at 9 (noting that there was legal controversy). 
 95. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2018) (providing individuals a right of access to certain 
information about themselves stored at HIPAA-covered facilities).  
 96. See REPORT supra note 10, at 28; see infra this Part (discussing the breadth of access 
under HIPAA’s access right). 
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practices surrounding it. By blurring two very different concepts, the 
Report overreached into subject matter—data privacy law—for which its 
committee membership was not constituted and which lay outside the 
jurisdiction of the three agencies sponsoring the Report. This Part 
highlights key differences between the two concepts.   
A.  Return of Results: History, Purpose, and Scope 
The practice of returning individual research results and incidental or 
secondary findings97 grew out of ethical and pragmatic concerns 
elaborated in the bioethics and scientific literature for decades and in 
consensus guidelines over the past twenty years.98 Beginning in 1999, 
consensus recommendations have urged researchers to offer some 
individual-specific findings to research participants.99 Most of these 
recommendations are based on ethical concepts including respect for 
autonomy, reciprocity, a limited duty of “ancillary care,” and an ethical 
duty to warn.100 No statute or regulation expressly commands return of 
these findings, but commentators have argued that the federal regulations 
                                                                                                                 
 97. Incidental or secondary findings are generally understood as findings from research that 
have potential clinical or reproductive relevance to the individual but are beyond the scope of the 
research aims. Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research, supra 
note 68, at 219. Secondary findings may be deliberately sought, while incidental findings typically 
are not. See PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, ANTICIPATE AND 
COMMUNICATE: ETHICAL MANAGEMENT OF INCIDENTAL AND SECONDARY FINDINGS IN THE 
CLINICAL, RESEARCH, AND DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER CONTEXTS 25–28 (2013), https://bioethics 
archive.georgetown.edu/pcsbi/sites/default/files/FINALAnticipateCommunicate_PCSBI_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5J6A-S3DC]. Some commentators use the two terms interchangeably. See 
Medically Actionable Secondary or Incidental Results, CSER, https://www.ashg.org/education/ 
csertoolkit/medicallyactionable.html [https://perma.cc/7F5P-8RGM]. 
 98. See, e.g., NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 8; Reilly, supra note 7; 
sources cited supra note 68 (citing additional guidelines). 
 99. See sources cited supra note 68. 
 100. For discussion of the ethical bases of return of research results and incidental or 
secondary findings, see, for example, Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human 
Subjects Research, supra note 68, at 227–33 and Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings and 
Research Results in Biobanks, supra note 68, at 367–69. The Academies’ Report includes an 
Appendix D addressing the ethical bases for return of results. REPORT, supra note 10, app. at 339–
56. Unfortunately, the Appendix evaluates that literature by asking whether it supports claims that 
the literature does not actually aim to support. For example, the Appendix says, “the focus here is 
limited to a narrow, fundamental question: When, if ever, is returning results . . . morally 
imperative for all human subjects research . . . ?” Id. app. at 340. However, the literature on return 
of results and incidental or secondary findings generally focuses on when results should, may, or 
should not be returned––not on whether they must be returned, much less across all human 
subjects research. See, e.g., Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects 
Research, supra note 68, at 219–20; Fabsitz et al., supra note 68; Wolf et al., Returning Genomic 
Results to Relatives, supra note 68. 
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governing research with human participants articulate relevant duties.101 
These include the duty to describe all expected risks and benefits in 
eliciting consent and the duty to include in the consent form, if required 
by the IRB, “a ‘statement that significant new findings developed during 
the course of research which may relate to the subject’s willingness to 
continue participation will be provided to the subject.’”102  While health 
care professionals providing clinical care may have common law duties 
to recognize and communicate incidental findings of health significance 
and have been sued for failure to do so, the potential liability of 
researchers is less clear.103 Research records may contain detailed 
information about participants, including genome sequencing104 or 
imaging results,105 giving rise to an ethical106 and possibly even a 
common law duty107 to warn participants of findings that suggest a need 
for follow-up clinical testing and evaluation.  
There is ongoing debate about how much of the information generated 
by research ought to be returned. A number of consensus 
recommendations distinguish findings that should be offered to 
participants, those that may be offered in the researcher’s discretion, and 
                                                                                                                 
 101. See, e.g., Susan M. Wolf et al., The Law of Incidental Findings in Human Subjects 
Research: Establishing Researchers’ Duties, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 361, 366 (2008); Wolf et al., 
Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research, supra note 68, at 227. 
 102. See Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings and Research Results in Biobanks, supra 
note 68, at 227–28 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2007); and also quoting 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(b)(5) 
(2007)). These provisions remain operative. 
 103. See Ellen Wright Clayton & Amy L. McGuire, The Legal Risks of Returning Results of 
Genomics Research, 14 GENETICS MED. 473, 475 (2012); Elizabeth R. Pike et al., Finding Fault? 
Exploring Legal Duties to Return Incidental Findings in Genomic Research, 102 GEO. L.J. 795, 
795 (2014); Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings and Research Results in Biobanks, supra 
note 68, at 219; Wolf et al., supra note 101, at 362; Susan M. Wolf, The Role of Law in the Debate 
over Return of Research Results and Incidental Findings: The Challenge of Developing Law for 
Translational Science, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 435, 435–37 (2012) [hereinafter Wolf, The 
Role of Law].  
 104. See Jarvik et al., supra note 68, at 818 (discussing research use of genome sequencing).  
 105. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Human 
Research Protections (SACHRP Day 2), NIH.GOV (May 26, 2017, 8:30 AM), 
https://videocast.nih.gov/PastEvents.asp?c=111 [https://perma.cc/6LVP-K5W7] (noting the 
potential for X-rays and MRIs to produce incidental findings during research).  
 106. See REPORT, supra note 10, at 60–61 (noting that “it might be argued that the research 
team has a ‘duty to warn’ or ‘duty to rescue’ the participant as he or she is in a position to prevent 
serious harm at little or no personal cost and the participant might otherwise not discover the 
condition in time,” and commenting that these duties “were originally legal concepts . . . and they 
are now also seen as referring to an ethical obligation” (footnotes omitted)); see also sources cited 
supra note 103.  
 107. See, e.g., Wolf, The Role of Law, supra note 103, at 435–37 (noting concerns about 
potential liability for failure to return results); Clayton & McGuire, supra note 103, at 475 (noting 
concerns, despite the absence of statutory duties to return research results and a lack of lawsuits 
to date that found a tort duty to return such results).  
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those that should not be offered.108 Some commentators confine the first 
category to results with analytic validity and clinical significance, such 
as laboratory test results having analytic validity,109 clinical validity,110 
and clinical utility111 or actionability.112 This view implicitly grounds 
“should return” in a duty to warn.  
Commentators have long recognized that researchers “may return”—
in other words, it is ethically permissible for them to return—a broader 
set of research findings, even when the clinical significance is unclear.113 
The information in question could include test results that warrant further 
evaluation such as genetic results that require further clinical evaluation 
or environmental exposure results whose clinical meaning is not yet well 
understood. Researchers may also offer findings that may be of 
reproductive or personal importance, such as the participant’s genetic 
carrier status or genetic risks (such as risk of developing Alzheimer’s 
disease) even if there is no efficacious treatment currently available. This 
view treats the return of information as serving broader health, dignitary, 
and pragmatic purposes beyond a mere duty to warn of clear danger—for 
example, displaying respect for participants’ autonomy and agency over 
                                                                                                                 
 108. See, e.g., Wolf et al., Managing Incidental in Human Subjects Research, supra note 68, 
at 235 tbl.5; Fabsitz et al., supra note 68, at 576; Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings and 
Research Results in Biobanks, supra note 68, at 372 tbl.4; Jarvik et al., supra note 68, at 823.  
 109. See SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETIC TESTING, ENHANCING THE OVERSIGHT OF 
GENETIC TESTS: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SACGT 15 (2000) (defining analytical validity as 
how accurately and consistently a test measures the property or characteristic it is intended to 
measure).  
 110. Id. at 15 n.11 (defining “clinical validity” as how well the test results correlate to the 
presence or absence of a clinical condition or predisposition). 
 111. Id. at 15 n.12 (defining “clinical utility” in terms of whether a test provides information 
that has value in identifying effective treatment or preventive strategies).  
 112. See Fabsitz et al., supra note 68, at 575 (“Actionable means that disclosure has the 
potential to lead to an improved health outcome; there must be established therapeutic or 
preventive interventions available or other available actions that may change the course of the 
disease.”). 
 113. See, e.g., Ingrid A. Holm & Patrick L. Taylor, The Informed Cohort Oversight Board: 
From Values to Architecture, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 669, 676 (2012) (supporting disclosure 
of information even if its clinical significance is uncertain but requiring that it be analytically 
valid); Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings and Research Results in Biobanks, supra note 
68, at 231 (noting that some definitions of “clinical utility” focus narrowly on health outcomes 
while others recognize utility if results are important to the individuals and families involved); 
Sec’y’s Advisory Comm. on Human Research Prots., Attachment B: Return of Individual 
Research Results, HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sachrp-committee/recommendations/ 
attachment-b-return-individual-research-results/index.html [https://perma.cc/2X73-M5Z4] (last 
reviewed July 21, 2016) (defining “individual research results” broadly to include information 
that may have no clinical or reproductive significance) (“SACHRP would like to stress that the 
individual results do not have to be of clinical value to the subjects in order for return to be 
considered.  Even if the results are not clinically relevant, the pure intellectual curiosity of the 
subjects is sufficient reason to return the results absent other reasons not to return them.”). 
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information that pertain to them, or enhancing their engagement with the 
research. 
The literature on return of results and incidental or secondary findings 
has also increasingly acknowledged the importance of recognizing 
participants’ right to receive their own raw data.114 This may enable 
participants to follow future progress in understanding data whose 
meaning is currently unclear. Access can also empower participants to 
contribute their data to other studies, initiate research studies in 
partnership with others, and form social networks with similar 
individuals.115 Surveys show that participants value the return of results 
and data even when the information is uncertain or lacks clinical 
significance.116  
B.  Privacy-Related Individual Access Rights: History, Purpose, 
and Scope 
The HIPAA access right has a distinct history, purpose, and scope. 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule,117 since it was first finalized in December 
2000,118 has always contained an individual access right.119 This is a 
legally enforceable civil right—specifically, a privacy right—created by 
federal regulations. Before 2014, however, this right could not be 
                                                                                                                 
 114. See, e.g., Barbara J. Evans et al., Regulatory Changes Raise Troubling Questions for 
Genomic Testing, 16 GENET. MED. 799, 799–803 (2014) (discussing the individual right of access 
to one’s own data and implications for return of results); Jeantine E. Lunshof et al., Raw Personal 
Data: Providing Access, 343 SCI. 373, 373 (2014) (“The possibility for research participants to 
access their raw data is a basic requirement for a just and reciprocal relationship . . . .”); Adrian 
Thorogood et al., APPLaUD: Access for Patients and Participants to Individual Level 
Uninterpreted Genomic Data, HUM. GENOMICS (2018), https://humgenomics.biomedcentral.com/ 
track/pdf/10.1186/s40246-018-0139-5 [https://perma.cc/37NV-D6FQ] (supporting “a default 
right of participants to access their own individual-level genomic data upon request”).  
 115. Wolf & Evans, Return, supra note 69, at 159.  
 116. See, e.g., Lisa S. Parker, Returning Individual Research Results: What Role Should 
People’s Preferences Play?, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 449, 456 (2012) (“What appears rather 
consistent across most of these studies is the finding that a substantial proportion of people express 
a desire for receiving research results.”) and see Juli Bollinger et al., Public Preferences 
Regarding the Return of Individual Genetic Research Results: Findings from a Qualitative Focus 
Group Study, 14 GENET. MED. 451 (2012) (articulating the interests served by individual access 
to results and data); Adrian Thorogood et al., APPLaUD: Access for Patients and Participants to 
Individual Level Uninterpreted Genomic Data, 12 HUM. GENOM. 7 (2018) (articulating the same); 
Jennifer L. Ohayon et al., Researcher and Institutional Review Board Perspectives on the Benefits 
and Challenges of Reporting Back Biomonitoring and Environmental Exposure Results, 153 
ENVIRON. RES. 140 (2017) (articulating the same). 
 117. 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164 (2018). 
 118. See generally Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 
Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (promulgating 
the HIPAA Privacy Rule and including the access right at 45 C.F.R. § 164.524). 
 119. 45 C.F.R. § 164.524. 
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exercised at HIPAA-covered laboratories in all fifty states, because some 
states had laws limiting individuals’ direct access to laboratory test 
results, and the federal HIPAA and CLIA regulations were deferring to 
those state-imposed restrictions.120 On February 6, 2014, CMS joined 
OCR in promulgating a final rule121 preempting state laws that limit 
people’s ability to exercise their access rights at HIPAA-covered 
laboratories.122 This made all HIPAA-covered laboratories subject to the 
access right.  
The Academies’ Report never discussed the history of privacy-related 
access rights. This omission left a false impression that HIPAA’s access 
right is some sort of recent innovation, an isolated aberration. To the 
contrary, HIPAA’s access right rests on a fifty-year history of federal 
privacy laws that treat individual access to one’s own data as a fair 
information practice and a core element of data privacy protections.123 
Indeed, the importance of individual access to data held by others is so 
                                                                                                                 
 120. See Barbara J. Evans, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act at Age 10: 
GINA’s Controversial Assertion that Data Transparency Protects Privacy and Civil Rights, 60 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2017, 2067–68 (2019) (providing a detailed review of the relevant 
government documents and advisory reports, and tracing the regulatory history of these 
restrictions). 
 121. CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 7290, 7290 (Feb. 6, 2014) (to 
be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 493, 45 C.F.R. pt. 164). 
 122. Id.  
 123. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 84 Stat. 1128 (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012)) (authorizing the collection and storage of people’s 
financial and credit data without their consent to facilitate a well-functioning credit market and, 
in return, granting individuals specific civil rights including a right of access to their data); see 
also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, PUB. NO. (OS) 73-94, REPORT OF THE 
SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS: RECORDS, 
COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS xx (1973) (announcing an influential Code of Fair 
Information Practices (FIPs) based on five principles, one of which is that “[t]here must be a way 
for an individual to find out what information about him is in a record and how it is used”); Fred 
H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE 
AGE OF THE ‘INFORMATION ECONOMY’ 343, 345–46 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006) (tracing subsequent 
development of FIPs, including access rights, after the 1973 HEW Code of FIPs); Privacy Act of 
1974, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a), (d) 
(2012)) (providing an individual right of access to data held in governmental databases, including 
governmentally held Medicare data); PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM’N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN 
INFORMATION SOCIETY 67 (1977) (treating individual access rights as a core privacy protection in 
a Privacy Act-commissioned report that heavily influenced the subsequent development of the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule); U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Confidentiality of Individually 
Identifiable Health Information: Recommendations of the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, Pursuant to Section 264 of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996 (Sept. 11, 1997), https://aspe.hhs.gov/report/confidentiality-individually-identifiable-
health-information [https://perma.cc/2V9X-XFAV] [hereinafter HHS, HIPAA Recommendations] 
(citing the Privacy Protection Study Commission’s Report and calling for individual access rights 
in the report to Congress that set the roadmap for the HIPAA Privacy Rule).  
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well established, that many states have recognized the same right in 
various contexts.124  
At the federal level, the Privacy Act of 1974 includes a congressional 
finding that data privacy is a fundamental right protected by the 
Constitution125 and it describes an individual right to inspect and obtain 
one’s own data as necessary and proper to protect this privacy right.126 
These are enacted congressional findings of fact—not just flowery words 
Congress put in front of the legislation, but an actual part of the legislation 
itself, passed by both houses of Congress, signed into law by President 
Ford, and recorded as statutes in the U.S. Code.127 The Privacy Act 
expresses Congress’s conviction that access enables the exercise of 
fundamental Constitutional rights.  
The Privacy Act provides privacy protections (including an access 
right) only for data held in governmental databases—for example, 
federally held Medicare data—but it commissioned a Privacy Protection 
Study Commission (PPSC) to recommend protections for data in private-
sector environments.128 HIPAA’s access right flows from these PPSC 
recommendations published in 1977.129 The 1996 HIPAA statute130 
required HHS, by 1997, to prepare a report for Congress on federal health 
privacy protections.131 This 1997 HHS report132 cited and incorporated 
                                                                                                                 
 124. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 13.04(3) (2018); Assemb. B. No. 375, 2018 Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Cal. 2018).  
 125. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a note  (2012) (“The Congress finds that . . . [t]he right to privacy is 
a personal and fundamental right protected by the Constitution of the United States[,] and . . . it 
is necessary and proper for the Congress to regulate the collection, maintenance, use, and 
dissemination of information . . . .”). 
 126. Id. (including, as a core element of data privacy protection, safeguards that “permit an 
individual to gain access to information pertaining to him . . . to have a copy made of all or any 
portion thereof, and to correct or amend such records”). 
 127. See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 129 (2008) (pointing out that Congressional findings of fact can include 
facts about the law); William D. Araiza, Deference to Congressional Fact-Finding in Rights-
Enforcing and Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88 N.Y.U.  L. REV. 878, 881–82 (2013) (discussing 
enacted Congressional findings of legal fact, such as the ones in the Privacy Act, and noting that 
while such findings are not, strictly speaking, binding on the courts, courts do give some weight 
to them and tend to give more weight to congressional findings that expand individual rights, as 
the Privacy Act findings do, than to those that reduce people’s rights). 
 128. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a), (d).  
 129. See generally PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM’N, supra note 123 (providing a set of 
recommendations, commissioned by Congress, for protecting individuals’ data privacy in the 
post-1970s information economy). 
 130. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C. 
(2012)). 
 131. Id. § 264(b). 
 132. See HHS, HIPAA Recommendations, supra note 123. 
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the PPSC’s 1977 recommendations in its roadmap for the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule.  
The Academies’ Report enumerates the many purposes that return of 
individual research results serves,133 but omits any discussion of the well-
articulated legislative and regulatory purposes served by privacy-related 
access rights, so we briefly fill this gap here. Return of results and 
privacy-related access exhibit some overlapping purposes—for example, 
both display respect for participants’ autonomy and both empower people 
to form social networks and contribute their data to other research 
studies—but their foundational purposes are distinct. As noted in the 
Academies’ Report, the return of results initially grew out of a perceived 
ethical duty to warn participants when research detects a potential health 
risk that the participant might otherwise have no way to know.134  
In contrast, HIPAA’s access right serves privacy-enabling purposes. 
These were first articulated in the PPSC’s 1977 report and in the 1997 
HHS recommendations to Congress.135 HHS, OCR, and CMS further 
elaborated the purposes of HIPAA’s access right in the preambles to 
proposed and final rules creating or expanding that right.136 Readers are 
referred elsewhere for a detailed discussion of these sources.137 To 
summarize, the foundational purpose of HIPAA’s access right is to 
enhance individual privacy protections. Unless people can see the 
information being stored about them, they cannot assess how much 
privacy risk the information may pose.138 Are the data embarrassing? Is 
their storage or circulation a source of concern? Are the data even 
accurate? Might the data contribute to identity theft? Could the data be 
used to re-identify the individual? Do the data include elements that 
might implicate them or a loved one in a crime, as recently happened in 
the case of the Golden State Killer?139 People can suffer discrimination 
or stigmatization based on inaccurate data that have been wrongly 
                                                                                                                 
 133. See generally REPORT, supra note 10, at 59–92 (discussing the return of individual 
research results). 
 134. See id. at 60–61. 
 135. See PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM’N, supra note 123, at 3; HHS, HIPAA 
Recommendations, supra note 123. 
 136. See Evans, supra note 120, at 2055 (providing a detailed review of the relevant 
government documents and advisory reports). 
 137. Id. at 2056–57. 
 138. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed. Reg. 
59,918, 59,980 (proposed Nov. 3, 1999) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (noting, in the 
preamble to the proposed Privacy Rule, that the right to inspect and copy one’s data “is a 
fundamental aspect of protecting privacy”). 
 139. See Gina Kolata & Heather Murphy, The Golden State Killer is Tracked Through a 
Thicket of DNA, and Experts Shudder, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/04/27/health/dna-privacy-golden-state-killer-genealogy.html [https://perma.cc/YUY9-4H4W]. 
1304 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71 
 
attributed to them and, without access, a person has little chance of ever 
detecting and correcting such errors.  
Another foundational purpose of privacy-related access rights is to 
enable people to give valid, informed consent for secondary use of their 
stored data. In its 1997 privacy recommendations to Congress,140 HHS 
stressed that the “decision whether to disclose a record may depend on 
what the record says, and so access to the record is integral to making an 
informed choice to disclose [information].”141 In this respect, the Privacy 
Rule holds informed consent to a higher ethical standard than does the 
Common Rule,142 a major federal research regulation. The Privacy Rule 
regards people’s authorizations for secondary uses of their stored data as 
ill-informed, unless they have a way to inspect the data they are being 
asked to share.143 This concept strikes some people as odd, yet it has 
considerable merit: When consenting to a third-party use of one’s data, 
being “informed” does not merely mean knowing how the data will be 
used; it also means knowing precisely what sort of data one is being asked 
to release to the third party. 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule creates a right for individuals to inspect and 
make copies of all of the data about themselves that a HIPAA-covered 
entity (such as a hospital, clinic, or HIPAA-regulated laboratory) has 
stored in each person’s designated record set (DRS).144 This right is 
subject only to a few narrow exceptions.145 The “designated record set” 
is the legal term of art denoting the HIPAA-accessible records about an 
individual stored at a particular HIPAA-covered facility.146 The DRS 
                                                                                                                 
 140. See HHS, HIPAA Recommendations, supra note 123. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 46, subpart A. 
 143. Cf. id. (providing no individual right of access to one’s own data under the Common 
Rule). Revisions to the Common Rule that went into effect on January 21, 2019 exacerbate this 
problem by allowing for “broad consent” to secondary uses, so that individuals may not know the 
content of their dataset released for secondary uses or the uses to which those data will be put. 45 
C.F.R. § 46.116(a), (d) (allowing broad consent to be obtained in lieu of traditional informed 
consent).  
 144. 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a) 
 145. Id.  
 146. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (“Designated record set means: (1) A group of records 
maintained by or for a covered entity that is: (i) The medical records and billing records about 
individuals maintained by or for a covered health care provider; (ii) The enrollment, payment, 
claims adjudication, and case or medical management record systems maintained by or for a 
health plan; or (iii) Used, in whole or in part, by or for the covered entity to make decisions about 
individuals.”); see also id.  § 160.103 (treating genetic information as health information for 
purposes of the Privacy Rule); id. § 164.501 (“[T]he term record means any item, collection, or 
grouping of information that includes protected health information and is maintained, collected, 
used, or disseminated by or for a covered entity.”). The content of a person’s DRS may vary from 
one HIPAA-covered entity to the next; for example, the person’s primary care physician may have 
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includes all records “[u]sed, in whole or in part . . . to make decisions 
about individuals.”147 HHS has clarified that this encompasses non-
medical as well as medical decision-making and information of a type 
that the facility uses to make decisions about any individuals, even if that 
information was not so used when making decisions about the person 
requesting the data.148  
A person’s DRS is not restricted to information that has clinical 
significance. In ordinary health-care contexts, for example, the DRS will 
include a wide range of information, including unverified, speculative 
doctors’ notes in patients’ charts.149 People have a legitimate privacy 
interest in being able to inspect any information ascribed to them, 
regardless of its reliability or clinical significance. Uncertain and 
misattributed data that lack any clinical significance can nevertheless 
place people’s privacy at risk and subject them to stigma and 
discrimination. Accordingly, the DRS for laboratory data “includes not 
only the laboratory test reports but also the underlying information 
generated as part of the test, as well as other information concerning tests 
a laboratory runs on an individual.”150 For genomic tests, the DRS could 
include “the completed test report, the full gene variant information 
generated by the test, as well as any other information in the designated 
record set concerning the test.”151  
The scope of the HIPAA-accessible DRS is considerably broader than 
the traditional, more restrictive view of return of results and incidental or 
secondary findings in service of a duty to warn. It is not, however, all that 
different from the emerging, broader ethical view of return of results and 
data in service of values such as respect for research participants’ 
autonomy and agency over their data.152 
                                                                                                                 
different records on file than does a hospital or laboratory with which the person has done 
business. The person’s DRS, at a given HIPAA-covered facility, consists of records that that 
facility maintains about the individual, so long as the records fall within the definition of 
“designated record set.”  
 147. Id. § 164.501. 
 148. See Evans et al., supra note 114, at 800 (relying on guidance HHS provided in the 
preamble to the rulemaking that initially implemented HIPAA’s access right at 45 C.F.R. 
§ 164.524). 
 149. Individuals’ Right under HIPAA to Access their Health Information 45 CFR § 164.524, 
HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance/access/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/9S7L-3QEP] (last updated Feb. 25, 2016).  
 150. Id.  
 151. Id.  
 152. See supra Section III.A; see also Susan M. Wolf, Return of Individual Research Results 
and Incidental Findings: Facing the Challenges of Translational Science, ANNU. REV. GENOM. 
HUM. GENET. 557, 561, 573 (2013) (“Return of results is the next frontier in the challenge of 
treating those people whose data and specimens make research possible as . . . . indispensable 
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Many, though not all, research facilities are subject to the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule.153 Their research records are subject to HIPAA’s access 
right on the same basis that clinical records are—that is, if they fit within 
the definition of the DRS.154 Precisely because HIPAA access includes 
access to research records, the Privacy Rule has always had an access 
exception letting research facilities suspend research participants’ access 
rights temporarily during clinical trials.155 Otherwise, research 
participants could access their research data while a clinical trial is 
ongoing and “un-blind” a trial whose validity requires “blinding” during 
data collection.156 This exception allows research data to be withheld only 
if the individual agreed to the temporary denial of access when 
consenting to the research,157 and access must be reinstated upon 
completion of the clinical trial.158 This exception proves the rule, which 
is that research results and data held by HIPAA-covered facilities are 
subject to HIPAA’s access right. 
C.  Differences in Administration, Customs, and Practices 
A number of customs, practices, and guidelines have developed for 
return of results and data. They are worth noting because they further 
distinguish this domain from the domain of privacy-related access rights.  
As a practical matter, the return of results and data can be initiated by 
either party—either because an investigator or research institution 
develops a policy or practice of offering return, or when research 
participants ask questions. Researchers and their institutions have 
considerable discretion over whether and how they choose to return 
results.159 In contrast, HIPAA access is provided at the request of the 
                                                                                                                 
partners in the research enterprise and people with a real stake in learning individual findings of 
significance.”). 
 153. See Evans et al., supra note 114, at 801 (explaining situations in which research 
laboratories may become HIPAA-covered entities). 
 154. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2018) (providing the definition of a DRS). 
 155. See id. § 164.524(a)(2)(iii); see also Individuals’ Right under HIPAA to Access their 
Health Information 45 CFR § 164.524, supra note 149 (summarizing this exception as allowing 
access to be delayed if the requested information is “in a designated record set that is part of a 
research study that includes treatment (e.g., clinical trial) and is still in progress, provided the 
individual agreed to the temporary suspension of access when consenting to participate in the 
research”). 
 156. An example would be a placebo-controlled randomized clinical trial, in which 
participants learning during data collection whether they are in the placebo arm of the trial could 
invalidate the results. 
 157. 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(2)(iii).  
 158. Id. 
 159. See discussion supra Section II.A (noting, for example, that there is a category of results 
that “may” be returned, which leaves decisions to the investigator’s or institution’s discretion). 
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individual. With only limited exceptions,160 HIPAA-covered entities 
must provide prompt access upon request.161 Failing to do so can lead to 
administrative sanctions and civil penalties.162 
Ethics review bodies such as Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) play 
an important oversight role in return of results and data and IRB, or 
dedicated return-of-results committees, may be involved in establishing 
policies.163 In contrast, the Privacy Rule does not subject HIPAA 
access—or any of HIPAA’s other privacy protections—to review or 
approval by an IRB. IRBs play no role in administering the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule, except that the Rule does grant covered entities the option 
of using their IRBs, instead of a special-purpose HIPAA privacy board, 
to approve waivers of individual authorization for research uses of 
data.164 Other than that, the legal protections of the HIPAA Privacy Rule 
are administered by a federal agency, the OCR, rather than by 
institutional committees. The Privacy Rule creates federally protected 
civil rights and does not authorize committees to second-guess or 
interfere with them. 
The ethical conduct of return of results is widely perceived to include 
a responsibility to provide interpretive assistance (for example, genetic 
counseling) to help participants make sense of the information they 
receive and understand recommended next steps such as clinical 
consultation.165 These responsibilities may contribute to the Report’s 
perception that returning results and data “necessarily requires the 
diversion of some research resources from the primary goal of the 
research.”166 In contrast, HIPAA access does not involve interpretive 
assistance, advice, or counseling. It is a “what’s on file is what you get” 
right.167 This flows from the fact that privacy-related access rights are 
                                                                                                                 
 160. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.524(a)(2), (3) (enumerating non-reviewable and reviewable 
grounds for denial of access). 
 161. See id. § 164.524(b)(2) (providing for access within 30 days, with up to one thirty-day 
extension possible if the covered entity provides a written explanation).  
 162. See Sebelius v. Uplift Med., PC, No. RWT 11CV2168, 2012 WL 8251345, at *1, *4 
(D. Md. Aug. 30, 2012) (enforcing civil fines of $4.3 million for denial of timely HIPAA access 
by forty-one patients, or approximately $100,000 per denied patient).   
 163. See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 152, at 558.   
 164. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i). 
 165. See REPORT, supra note 10, at 195 (discussing the importance of communications with 
persons receiving return of results and providing examples of some of the practices that 
researchers and institutions have followed). 
 166. Id. at 59. 
 167. See CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 7290, 7293 (Feb. 6, 2014) 
(to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 493, 45 C.F.R. pt. 164) (“Finally, we clarify that this final rule 
does not require that laboratories interpret test results for patients. Patients merely have the right 
to inspect and receive a copy of their completed test reports and other individually identifiable 
health information maintained in a designated record set by a HIPAA-covered laboratory.”). 
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tools for managing privacy risks rather than health risks. The goal is to 
reveal what is on file, not what it means. Data holders can charge a very 
restricted cost-based fee to cover some of the costs of access—such as 
mailing and copying costs.168 The Privacy Rule allows data holders at 
their discretion to provide explanations and interpretive assistance under 
separate arrangements, if the recipient requests such help and agrees to 
pay the fee, if any, for such services.169 HIPAA requires data holders to 
provide information in the DRS, but does not require them to provide 
advisory services.170 
III.  THE SCOPE OF CMS’S JURISDICTION TO REGULATE RESEARCH 
LABORATORIES 
The Academies’ Report opens with an assertion that HIPAA’s access 
right171 is in conflict with the CLIA regulations172 and repeats this 
assertion throughout the document.173 By doing so, the Report embraces 
a dubious position CMS asserted in its 2014 PDF file: that non-CLIA 
research laboratories reporting individual-specific results violate the 
CLIA regulations.174 The PDF file pays no attention to why the laboratory 
is reporting the results: Is it reporting them for use in the individual’s 
clinical care, or to warn a participant to seek follow-up testing and clinical 
evaluation of a secondary finding from research, or to comply with 
HIPAA’s access requirement? According to the PDF position, it makes 
no difference; the mere act of providing the information triggers 
jurisdiction under the CLIA regulations.175 
The Report characterizes CMS’s PDF file as an “interpretation” of the 
CLIA regulations—that is, as an interpretative rule176 or general policy 
                                                                                                                 
 168. 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(c)(4). 
 169. Id.; see also id. § 164.524(c)(3)(ii).  
 170. See CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 7293.  
 171. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.524. 
 172. See 42 C.F.R. pt. 493; see also REPORT, supra note 10, at 2 (saying that recent changes 
to the HIPAA Privacy Rule expanded individuals’ access to their clinical and research test results, 
but that CLIA “bars laboratories that are not CLIA certified from reporting individual research 
results,” creating a “dilemma”).  
 173. See sources cited supra note 62.  
 174. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 74. 
 175. See discussion infra Sections IV.B, IV.C. 
 176. See Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1946) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.) (providing an exception, at 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553(b)(3)(A), to the APA’s notice-and-comment requirement when agencies issue 
“[interpretive] rules, general statements of policy, rules of agency organization, procedure, or 
practice,” which scholars refer to collectively as non-legislative rules). This exception applies 
unless another statute, such as the agency’s enabling statute, provides otherwise. 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553(b)(3). 
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statement177 (together, “guidance document”178). The Report seems 
unaware of the legal implications of characterizing the position stated in 
the PDF file as an “interpretation.” This characterization, if it were 
correct, would have important legal consequences. First, it would bear on 
whether issuing the PDF file was even lawful. Guidance documents do 
not require notice-and-comment rulemaking179 under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA).180 CMS did not follow notice-and-comment 
procedures when publishing the PDF file. If it was just an interpretive 
guidance document, then it was lawful, but if the PDF file was something 
more—such as an attempt to rewrite the CLIA regulations—it violated 
the APA. Second, the PDF file might be able to escape judicial review, if 
viewed as a mere guidance document, because of questions about its 
finality181 and ripeness.182 If, despite these barriers, the PDF file 
somehow did come under judicial scrutiny, as guidance documents 
occasionally do,183 CMS would expect to receive deference under Auer 
v. Robbins,184 which gives controlling weight to an agency’s 
interpretation of its own regulations, with only limited exceptions.185  
The Academies’ Report obligingly characterized CMS’s position as 
an “interpretation” of the CLIA regulations, and accorded it controlling 
                                                                                                                 
 177. Id.  
 178. See Sean Croston, Recent Development, The Petition is Mightier than the Sword: 
Rediscovering an Old Weapon in the Battles Over ‘Regulation by Guidance,’ 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 
381, 382 (2011) (defining “guidance documents” as “those official ‘statement[s] of general 
applicability and future effect, other than [regulations]’ that set forth ‘a policy on a statutory, 
regulatory, or technical issue or an interpretation of a statutory or regulatory issue” (alterations in 
original) (quoting The Office of Management and Budget, Final Bulletin for Agency Good 
Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432, 3434 (Jan. 25, 2007) (drawing on the Administrative 
Procedure Act’s definition of a “rule” at 5 U.S.C. 551(4) in developing this definition)); see also 
Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance Documents, 90 
TEX. L. REV. 331, 334 n.14 (2011) (using “guidance documents” to refer collectively to policy 
statements and interpretive rules).  
 179. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c) (2012) (requiring that agencies issuing new legislative rules—
such as a new regulation or an amendment to an existing one—must follow notice and public 
comment procedures and publish the rule in the Federal Register at least 30 days before it takes 
effect).  
 180. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
 181. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (providing for review of “final agency action”). 
 182. Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 397, 411–12 (2007). 
 183. See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1023, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(voiding an agency’s guidance document on the basis that the guidance amounted to a regulatory 
revision that should have been promulgated according to notice-and-comment procedures).  
 184. 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
 185. Id. at 461. 
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weight.186 Whether that was appropriate, however, depends on the 
jurisdictional provisions of the CLIA statute and regulations, which the 
committee was forbidden to examine.187 The discussion below supplies 
the omitted analysis, concluding that the CMS PDF file contradicts the 
underlying regulation it purports to interpret, attempts to rewrite the 
CLIA regulations without notice-and-comment rulemaking and, 
moreover, violates the CLIA statute, and thus cannot be viewed as lawful 
and controlling.  
A.  The CLIA Statute’s Jurisdictional Rule 
The CLIA statute arose in 1988 when Congress amended188 an earlier 
statute, the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act of 1967.189 When the 
House bill that became the 1967 CLIA statute was reported out of the 
House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, the Chair of that 
committee explained that there was no intent to regulate research 
laboratories: 
We intend by this legislation to cover those commercial 
laboratories which are engaged in the business of examining 
specimens, and provided an exemption for laboratories not 
directly involved in this type of operation such as those 
operated by insurance companies.   
In addition, it should be pointed out that the bill does not 
cover laboratories engaged in research where examination of 
specimens is directed toward that end rather than to the 
treatment of patients.190 
Congress implemented this intent by enacting the CLIA statute’s 
jurisdictional provision.191 It states that a facility must comply with CLIA 
if it fits within CLIA’s definition of a “laboratory,”192 which is:  
a facility for the biological, microbiological, serological, 
chemical, immuno-hematological, hematological, 
biophysical, cytological, pathological, or other examination 
of materials derived from the human body [i.e., 
                                                                                                                 
 186. See, e.g., REPORT, supra note 10, at 46, 103, 124 (treating the PDF position as an agency 
“interpretation” of the CLIA regulations). 
 187. Id. at 46.  
 188. See Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-578, 102 
Stat. 2903 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 263a (2012)). 
 189. Pub. L. No. 90-174, 81 Stat. 536 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 263(a)). 
 190. See 113 CONG. REC. 26,006 (1967) (statement of Rep. Harley O. Staggers).  
 191. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a). 
 192. Id.  
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biospecimens, such as blood, urine, or tissue samples] for the 
purpose of providing information for the diagnosis, 
prevention, or treatment of any disease or impairment of, or 
the assessment of the health of, human beings.193  
The CLIA statute clarifies that this concept of a “laboratory” denotes 
a “clinical laboratory.”194 Other laboratory facilities that do not fit this 
definition are not subject to CLIA. Figure 1 portrays CLIA’s 
jurisdictional provision: facilities that meet the condition in the white area 
of Figure 1 are subject to CLIA; those in the shaded area are not. The 


















Laboratory tests provide information in the form of test results and 
other data such as genome sequence information. CLIA asks, “For what 
use is the laboratory providing information?” According to the CLIA 
statute and regulations, a laboratory falls under CLIA if it is “providing 
information for the diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of any disease or 
impairment of, or the assessment of the health of, human beings”195—in 
other words, if it is providing information for a list of specific clinical 
uses (see white area in Figure 1).  
                                                                                                                 
 193. Id.; see also 81 Stat. 536 (showing the language of the 1967 version of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 263a(a), which was the same as the current jurisdictional provision, except that it used the term 
“health of, man” instead of the more modern “health of human beings”). 
 194. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a). 
 195. Id. (emphasis added); see also 42 C.F.R. §§ 493.1, 493.2 (2018) (applying the CLIA 
regulations to facilities that meet the definition of “laboratory” set out in 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a)). 
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CLIA jurisdiction depends not just on what Congress said in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 263a(a), but on what Congress refrained from saying. Two textual 
omissions are important. The first is that Congress supplied no special, 
technical definition of the word “for,” which appears in the jurisdictional 
phrase “providing information for diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of 
any disease or impairment of, or the assessment of the health of, human 
beings.”196 Consequently, the word is not a legal term of art and takes its 
ordinary, everyday meaning.197 The word “for,” according to its primary 
dictionary meaning, is “a function word to indicate purpose” and “to 
indicate an intended goal.”198 CLIA jurisdiction thus depends on the 
laboratory’s purpose or intended goal199 in providing information from a 
test: Does the laboratory intend for the information to be put to a clinical 
use (diagnosis, prevention, or treatment, or assessment of health)? 
The second and more profound omission is that CLIA supplies no 
definitions for the terms “diagnosis,” “prevention,” “treatment,” and 
“assessment of health,” which play a central role in determining the scope 
of CLIA’s applicability. This omission respects principles of federalism. 
The federal power to regulate medical practice, a traditional area of state 
regulation, has been a hot-button issue dating back to the intense 
legislative debate preceding passage of the 1938 Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act200 and flaring up most recently in connection with the 
                                                                                                                 
 196. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a) (emphasis added). 
 197. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 69 (2012) (describing the “Ordinary-Meaning Canon” which provides that “[w]ords are to 
be understood in their ordinary, everyday meanings—unless the context indicates that they bear 
a technical sense” (emphasis omitted)). 
 198. See For, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/for (stating, as the primary definition of the word “for”: “1a—used as a function word 
to indicate purpose” and “b—used as a function word to indicate an intended goal”). 
 199. CLIA’s focus on the laboratory’s intent, unsurprisingly, is reminiscent of the approach 
Congress followed when defining the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) jurisdiction to 
regulate drugs and medical devices. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (2012) (defining “drugs” that FDA 
has jurisdiction to regulate); id. § 321(h) (defining FDA-regulated devices, including diagnostic 
devices). These statutes base FDA’s jurisdiction on the manufacturer’s intended use of the 
products. A laboratory’s purpose or intent may seem like interior, psychological phenomena that 
would be hard for a regulator to infer, but U.S. federal agencies routinely draw such inferences in 
their day-to-day decision-making, based on objective facts such as what the regulated party did 
and said and the circumstances in which they acted. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 801.4 (listing objective 
data FDA considers in inferring whether a device is “intended” for clinical use). 
 200. Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040  (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 1–2252 
(2012)); see Joel E. Hoffman, Administrative Procedures of the Food and Drug Administration, 
in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT THERAPEUTIC PRODUCTS 
13, 17–24 (David G. Adams et al. eds., 1999) (discussing the legislative debate in the late 1930s); 
see also Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,455, 16,503 
(Aug. 15, 1972) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 130) (discussing, in the preamble to a proposed 
rulemaking, Congress’s legislative intent in passing the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act). 
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Affordable Care Act.201 There is little doubt that, under modern law, the 
federal government has authority to touch medical practice issues 
incident to its federal medical product and clinical laboratory regulations, 
but Congress and federal agencies make an effort to respect the states’ 
role.202 The states, through their medical practice acts, other statutes, and 
common law, define the scope of medical practice and when it begins and 
ends.203  
The CLIA statute leaves it for the states to determine whether a 
particular human interaction amounts to diagnosing, preventing, or 
treating an illness or assessing the person’s health. When revising the 
CLIA regulations in 1993, the Health Care Financing Administration 
(HCFA, the earlier name for today’s CMS) affirmed its intent not to 
regulate laboratories that report results for purposes unrelated to the 
“patient care context which helps define the scope of the CLIA statute 
and these regulations.”204 The states, by setting the boundaries of the 
patient care context, ultimately define the scope of CLIA’s jurisdiction. 
To summarize, a laboratory falls under CLIA jurisdiction when it 
provides information for—in its ordinary, everyday sense of “with the 
purpose or intended goal of”—“diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of 
any disease or impairment of, or the assessment of the health of, human 
beings,” as these terms are defined by the relevant states in which these 
acts occur.205 If the laboratory is providing information for other, non-
clinical uses—such as forensic uses or the pursuit of scientific 
discovery—it is not even a “laboratory”206 under CLIA’s definition, and 
CLIA does not apply to it. Such a laboratory can operate lawfully without 
obtaining a CLIA certificate or meeting the conditions to be CLIA-
exempt (that is, meeting the conditions required by New York or 
Washington state).207 Today, some research laboratories voluntarily 
                                                                                                                 
 201. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 42 U.S.C.). 
 202. See David G. Adams, The Food and Drug Administration’s Regulation of Health Care 
Professionals, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 200, at 423 (noting that 
FDA, as a matter of policy, “has traditionally taken the position that it does not regulate the 
practice of medicine or pharmacy and has generally avoided regulatory actions that would directly 
restrict or interfere with professional service to patients.”).  
 203. 46 AM. JUR. 2D Existence of Physician and Patient Relationship §§ 3, 5, 6, 9 (2019); see 
also Patrick D. Blake, Note, Redefining Physicians’ Duties: An Argument for Eliminating the 
Physician-Patient Relationship Requirement in Actions for Medical Malpractice, 40 GA. L. REV. 
573, 601 (2006). 
 204. Health Care Finance Administration, Preamble to revised final CLIA regulations, 58 
Fed. Reg. 5,215, 5,218–19 (Jan. 19, 1993). 
 205. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a) (2012). 
 206. Id.; see also 42 C.F.R. § 493.2 (2018) (adopting the same definition in the CLIA 
regulations). 
 207. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
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choose to comply with CLIA, while others maintain non-CLIA status by 
conducting their analyses for non-clinical uses (such as research) rather 
than for the clinical uses that trigger jurisdiction under the CLIA statute. 
To be clear, the above discussion was merely quoting the CLIA statute 
(reporting what the statute says), not interpreting it.  The Report at times 
dismissed scholarly works that merely quote statutes as “[r]elying on 
principles of statutory interpretation.”208 The Report thus embraced a 
view that “the statute is not the law, but only an [interpretation] of it.”209 
By this view, an agency that flouts the plain language of a statute is 
merely “interpreting” it, and scholars who quote statutes are merely 
advancing an alternative interpretation. 
In reality, what the law is depends on what the law says, with federal 
statutes sitting near the top of the legal evidentiary hierarchy.210 If you 
want to know the scope of permissible CMS regulation and actions under 
CLIA, you have to read the CLIA statute. Astonishingly, the Report’s 
SOT dismissed the CLIA statute as a source of evidence of what the law 
is, and instead assumed the CMS PDF file to be controlling without 
analyzing its fidelity to the statute.211 This should have been a red flag. 
Until Congress amends the CLIA statute, it is the law. CMS has no 
authority to take positions in conflict with that law. This fundamental fact 
is core to any consideration of the topics addressed in the Academies’ 
Report. 
B.  Applying CLIA’s Jurisdictional Rule to Research Laboratories—
the History 
Applying CLIA’s jurisdictional rule to research laboratories raises 
issues that were considered at the very birth of the current CLIA 
regulations. HCFA grappled with these complexities during the 1992 
rulemaking that drew the contours of today’s CLIA regulations.212 This 
history is enlightening. 
Even though Congress disclaimed intent to regulate research 
facilities,213 many research laboratories sought further reassurance that 
                                                                                                                 
 208. See, e.g., REPORT, supra note 10, at 316. 
 209. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 197, at 397 (criticizing the mistaken view that “[t]he 
statute is not the law, but only evidence of it”).  
 210. See, e.g., Pennington v. Coxe, 6 U.S. 33, 52 (1804) (“That a law is the best expositor of 
itself.”). 
 211. See, e.g., REPORT, supra note 10, at 7 box S-2 (quoting the REPORT’s SOT, which 
provides that “[t]he committee will also not provide any legal interpretation or analysis regarding 
the scope or applicability of CLIA”). 
 212. See Regulations Implementing the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 
1988 (CLIA), 57 Fed. Reg. 7,002, 7,002–16 (Feb. 28, 1992) (codified in scattered sections of 42 
C.F.R.). 
 213. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
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they would not fall under the CLIA regulations. To allay these concerns, 
HCFA initially proposed to have the CLIA regulations embed a research 
exception within their definition of a regulated laboratory.214 This 
proposal drew fire, however, because some research laboratories wanted 
to fall under CLIA jurisdiction.215 A laboratory cannot bill Medicare 
unless it is CLIA-certified, and these research laboratories wanted “to 
assure that they can continue to receive reimbursement for tests 
performed.”216 HCFA responded that “[i]f the results of such 
‘experimental’ testing are used for individual treatment of the patient 
tested, the laboratory would be subject to CLIA requirements.”217 In other 
words, if a research laboratory plans to bill a health insurer or Medicare 
for a test, then it clearly is providing information with an intent for 
clinical use and, under CLIA’s definition, it is a clinical laboratory.  
HCFA ultimately concluded that the CLIA statute’s jurisdictional 
provision “clearly defines the type of facility subject to regulation and is 
specific with respect to its applicability to facilities that conduct testing 
for the medical diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of individuals.”218  
These words, written after Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.,219 had profound significance. When Congress 
clearly speaks to an issue there is no room for federal agencies or courts 
to interpret the statute; they must simply follow it.220 HCFA understood 
this legal principle and determined that the statute’s language, being 
clear, left no room for the CLIA regulations to further interpret the 
agency’s jurisdiction. Accordingly, HCFA decided that the CLIA 
regulations should simply repeat—or “parrot”221—the same 
jurisdictional language that the CLIA statute uses to define a CLIA-
regulated “laboratory.”222 Table 1 compares the statutory and regulatory 
language. 
                                                                                                                 
 214. See Regulations Implementing the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 
1988 (CLIA), 55 Fed. Reg. 20,896, 20,917 (proposed May 21, 1990) (codified as amended at 42 
C.F.R. § 493.2) (defining “laboratory” at 42 C.F.R. § 493.2 which added to the statutory language 
at 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a)). 
 215. Regulations Implementing the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, 
57 Fed. Reg. at 7015. 
 216. Id.  
 217. Id.  
 218. Id. at 7014. 
 219. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 220. See id. at 842–83 (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for 
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress.”).  
 221. See 1 PIERCE, supra note 82, § 6.11, at 527 (discussing “parroting” regulations that 
merely incorporate language taken from a statute).  
 222. See  42 C.F.R. § 493.2 (2018) (following Congress’s definition of “laboratory” verbatim 
in the text of the current CLIA regulation). 
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Table 1. Parroted Jurisdictional Language 
Source Jurisdiction-triggering conditions:  
an act + scienter 
CLIA Statute 
 
42 U.S.C. § 263a(a) 
A facility becomes subject to the CLIA statute 
by: 
“providing information for the diagnosis, 
prevention, or treatment of any disease or 
impairment of, or the assessment of the health 
of, human beings.”223  
CLIA Regulations 
 
42 C.F.R. §§ 493.1, 
493.2 
  
A facility becomes subject to the CLIA 
regulations by: 
“providing information for the diagnosis, 
prevention, or treatment of any disease or 
impairment of, or the assessment of the health 
of, human beings.”224   
 
The jurisdictional language is identical: The CLIA statute, at 42 
U.S.C. § 263a(a), provides that a facility becomes subject to the CLIA 
statute by “providing information for the diagnosis, prevention, or 
treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the assessment of the health 
of, human beings.”225 The CLIA regulations, at 42 C.F.R. §§ 493.1, 
493.2, apply this same rule.226  
Both these passages require two conditions to be met, before a 
laboratory falls under the CLIA regulations. First, the laboratory must 
perform an act (“providing information”).227 Second, the laboratory must 
perform this act for an enumerated list of purposes: “for the diagnosis, 
prevention, or treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the 
assessment of the health of, human beings.”228 This second condition 
amounts to a scienter requirement: it is not merely the act, but the 
laboratory’s intent when performing the act, that triggers CLIA 
regulation.  
The preamble to the 1992 final rule makes clear that when research 
laboratories report individual-specific results without an intent for 
clinical use, they are not subject to the CLIA regulations: “Several 
commenters [in that proceeding] noted that research laboratories 
including National Institutes of Health (NIH) laboratories perform 
experimental tests on human specimens and may include test information 
                                                                                                                 
 223. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 224. Id. (emphasis added). 
 225. Id.  
 226. See 42 C.F.R. § 493.2. 
 227. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a); 42 C.F.R. § 493.2. 
 228. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a); 42 C.F.R. § 493.2.  
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in the patient’s medical record for completeness.”229 These research 
laboratories were concerned that this reporting of individual-specific 
results might place them under the new CLIA regulations.230 HCFA 
concluded this was not the case and, to reassure them, HCFA inserted 
CLIA’s research exception at 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2).231 This exception 
stresses that the CLIA regulations do not apply unless research 
laboratories “report patient specific results for the diagnosis, prevention 
or treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the assessment of the 
health of individual patients.”232 Table 2 compares the research exception 
to the jurisdictional language of the CLIA statute and regulations. 
 
Table 2. Parroted language in the CLIA research exception 
Source Jurisdictional conditions: an act + scienter 
CLIA Statute and 
Regulations 
 
42 U.S.C. § 263a(a); 
42 C.F.R. §§ 493.1, 
493.2 
A facility triggers CLIA jurisdiction by: 
“providing information for the diagnosis, 
prevention, or treatment of any disease or 
impairment of, or the assessment of the health 







A facility escapes CLIA jurisdiction if it: 
“do[es] not report patient specific results 
for the diagnosis, prevention or treatment of 
any disease or impairment of, or the 
assessment of the health of . . . individual 
patients.”234   
 
The research exception parrots the same scienter requirement seen in 
the CLIA statute and regulations: The jurisdictional provisions provide 
that a facility triggers CLIA jurisdiction by “providing information for 
the diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of any disease or impairment of, 
                                                                                                                 
 229. Id. Regulations Implementing the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 
1988 (CLIA), 57 Fed. Reg. 7002, 7015 (Feb. 28, 1992) (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 
C.F.R.). 
 230. Id. 
 231. See id. (“In the proposed rule at § 493.2 under the definition of ‘laboratory’ we indicated 
that ‘laboratories that perform research testing on human specimens, but do not report patient 
specific results for the diagnosis, prevention or treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the 
assessment of the health of an individual patient are not considered laboratories under CLIA.’ 
However, this exception was not included in § 493.3, ‘Applicability.’ Thus, we have amended 
this section to reflect this exception for research laboratories.”). 
 232. 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2). 
 233. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a) (2012) (emphasis added); see also 42 C.F.R. § 493.2 (stating the 
same). 
 234. 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2). 
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or the assessment of the health of, human beings.”235 The research 
exception emphasizes that a facility avoids CLIA jurisdiction if it “do[es] 
not report patient specific results for the diagnosis, prevention or 
treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the assessment of the health 
of individual patients.”236 
The research exception highlights that reporting “patient specific 
results” (as opposed to providing information more generally) is the act 
that potentially raises concerns at a research laboratory.237 Yet even if a 
laboratory reports “patient specific results,” it escapes CLIA regulation if 
the reporting is for non-clinical purposes.   
In the 1992 CLIA rulemaking preamble, HCFA explained that 
reporting patient-specific experimental test results into a patient’s 
medical record “for completeness” does not, by itself, violate the research 
exception and trigger CLIA regulation.238 However, reporting patient-
specific results “for individual treatment of the patient tested”239  would 
cause the laboratory to fall under CLIA. According to HCFA’s 
interpretation, reporting individual research results into a patient’s 
medical record for the sake of record-keeping “completeness” does not 
amount to “treatment” and is not a clinical use, even though the record in 
question is the person’s medical record. 
HCFA’s 1992 interpretation carries considerable legal weight because 
it appears in the preamble to a final rule in which HCFA was exercising 
its congressionally delegated authority to promulgate regulations 
consistent with the CLIA statute’s jurisdictional language, after notice 
and an opportunity for the public to comment. HCFA’s interpretation thus 
would be Chevron-eligible under current doctrines.240 Courts following 
these doctrines would tend to view HCFA’s interpretation as controlling. 
According to HCFA, it is not the mere act of reporting individual-specific 
results, but the laboratory’s reason for doing so, that triggers CLIA 
regulation of a research laboratory. HCFA’s interpretation closely 
follows the text of the CLIA statute and its scienter requirement. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 235. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a); see also 42 C.F.R. § 493.2 (stating the same). 
 236. 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2). 
 237. See id.  
 238. See id. 
 239. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, 57 Fed. Reg. 7015 (Feb. 28, 
1992) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 493). 
 240. See generally United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (addressing the 
applicability of judicial deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. to statements agencies make during notice-and-comment rulemaking and in less 
formal settings). 
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IV.  CMS’S RECENT POSITION ON ITS JURISDICTION TO REGULATE 
RESEARCH LABS 
In its 2014 PDF file CMS asserts far broader jurisdiction to regulate 
research laboratories than HCFA claimed in 1992 when the agency 
promulgated the CLIA regulations.241 As recited in the Academies’ 
Report, CMS’s current position is that “only those facilities performing 
research testing on human biospecimens that do not report patient-
specific results may qualify to be excepted from CLIA certification.”242 
By this view, research laboratories operating under CLIA’s research 
exception243 will fall under the CLIA regulations if they report individual-
specific research results for any purpose, including for non-clinical uses. 
Part IV discusses CMS’s PDF file and concludes that it is contrary to the 
CLIA statute and regulations and merits no deference. 
A.  Ambivalence and Statutory Deviations  
During 2014, CMS displayed considerable ambivalence about the 
position expressed in the PDF file. On February 6 of that year, CMS 
joined OCR, which administers the HIPAA Privacy Rule and GINA’s 
genetic privacy provisions,244 in promulgating the final rule245 expanding 
HIPAA’s individual access right to include data stored at HIPAA-
covered laboratories. CMS’s participation in that rulemaking is high-
quality legal evidence that CMS saw no conflict between HIPAA’s access 
right and the CLIA regulations on that date. It is presumed that federal 
regulators are competent and know what is in the regulations they 
promulgate and would not knowingly issue a new regulation that conflicts 
with other laws. On February 6, 2014, CMS apparently felt there was no 
conflict between the HIPAA and CLIA regulations.  
Eight months later, with the new laboratory access right set to take 
effect on October 6, a group of NIH-funded researchers pointed out that 
HIPAA’s access right seems to include individual access to uninterpreted 
(raw) data as well as interpreted genomic test results246—a view that OCR 
                                                                                                                 
 241. See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 74. 
 242. REPORT, supra note 10, at 9 (quoting Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 
74). 
 243. See 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2). 
 244. See Delegation of Authority to OCR to Implement/Enforce HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra 
note 53; see also Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 
§ 105(b), 122 Stat. 881, 905 (delegating responsibility to implement GINA’s privacy mandate to 
HHS and, by implication, to OCR based on the earlier subdelegation of HHS’s HIPAA 
responsibilities to OCR). 
 245. CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 7290, 7290 (Feb. 6, 2014) (to 
be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 493, 45 C.F.R. pt. 164). 
 246. See Evans et al., supra note 114, at 801.  
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subsequently confirmed in a 2016 guidance document.247 At some 
genomic research laboratories, the prospect of having to provide access 
to data and results creates various concerns that the Academies’ Report 
describes: concerns, for example, that participants might be confused by 
access to potentially unreliable research data,248 and that implementing 
the access right could be costly and burdensome for researchers and 
might reduce their productivity.249 The Report emphasizes that funds for 
biomedical research “are precious and require careful and responsible 
stewardship,” and allowing participants to have such broad data access 
requires resources.250 In short, providing HIPAA access might be costly 
and inconvenient for researchers  
Whether motivated by these concerns or others, CMS abruptly 
reversed course on or about December 2014, posting the PDF file251 on 
its CLIA web page. The file does not disclose its authorship, leaving it 
unclear whether it is an official statement by CMS.252 Posting it on 
CMS’s CLIA web page, however, creates the impression that CMS 
endorses it. It resembles a guidance document,253 but it has none of the 
disclaimers with which federal agencies often adorn guidance documents 
(such as a statement that it is non-binding).254 It seems to state a position 
that CMS plans to enforce.   
The PDF file implies that there is a conflict between the HIPAA and 
CLIA regulations, thus supplying a pretext for non-CLIA research 
laboratories to avoid complying with HIPAA’s access right. This asserted 
conflict has added to confusion. In the face of this alleged conflict, OCR 
has seemed reluctant to enforce the access right at research laboratories. 
Enforcement has long been an issue under HIPAA. The weakness of 
HIPAA’s administrative enforcement structure255 has been particularly 
                                                                                                                 
 247. Individuals’ Right under HIPAA to Access their Health Information 45 CFR § 164.524, 
supra note 149. 
 248. See REPORT, supra note 10, at 71, 204, 211, 218. 
 249. See id. at 73. 
 250. Id. at 59 (stating that allowing participants to have such broad data access “necessarily 
requires the diversion of some research resources from the primary goal of the research”). 
 251. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 74. 
 252. See id. 
 253. See supra note 178.  
 254. See Mendelson, supra note 182, at 401 n.17 (noting that including such disclaimers in 
guidance documents has been more systematic since 2000, when several agencies were criticized 
for failure to make clear whether their statements were intended to be non-binding/nonlegislative 
versus binding/legislative); see also H.R. REP. NO. 106-1009, at 8–9 (2000) (leveling such 
criticisms). 
 255. See HHS, HIPAA Recommendations, supra note 123 (expressing concern, in a report to 
Congress, that the HIPAA statute’s lack of a private right of action would undermine protections 
under the HIPAA Privacy Rule and calling on Congress to enact new health privacy legislation 
containing a private right of action, which Congress did not do).  
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evident throughout this CLIA-HIPAA impasse. The Privacy Rule lacks a 
private right of action allowing citizen lawsuits to enforce its 
requirements.256 Enforcement depends on OCR. If this Office for Civil 
Rights goes wobbly on civil rights enforcement, as it did in this instance, 
it is difficult for research participants to enlist the federal courts to resolve 
questions of law such as “Is there, or is there not, a conflict between 
HIPAA and CLIA?”257 An office committed to diligent civil rights 
enforcement would have carefully scrutinized the CMS assertion of a 
conflict between HIPAA and CLIA regulations and, if necessary, would 
have pressed for rapid resolution of this question. Instead, the impasse 
has dragged on for four years, with research participants frequently 
denied a core federal privacy right while it festers.258  
To those versed in administrative law, the PDF file had all the 
markings of an embattled agency seeking to appease its regulated 
industry by blocking an unpopular new regulation.259 A 2006 report by 
the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) documented prior 
incidents in which CMS used informal means to circumvent the CLIA 
statute to reduce regulatory burdens on laboratories.260   In one instance, 
GAO found CMS had reduced the frequency of proficiency testing at 
many laboratories from quarterly, as the CLIA statute requires, to three 
times per year.261 When GAO requested the administrative record on 
which CMS based this decision, “CMS supplied a brief, undated 
narrative”262 and justified its deviation from the statute by claiming the 
“reduced frequency would provide a ‘needed respite’ to both laboratories 
and proficiency testing providers.”263 “According to CMS’s justification, 
experts were divided on the appropriate frequency of proficiency testing 
                                                                                                                 
 256. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.306 (2018); see also Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 571–72 (5th 
Cir. 2006) (holding, in the first federal appellate decision to address this issue, that the Privacy 
Rule does not create a private right of action). 
 257. See Mendelson, supra note 182, at 423–24 (discussing the difficulties regulatory 
beneficiaries—such as research participants—face in challenging agencies that fail to protect their 
rights).  
 258. See, e.g., Lye et al., supra note 27 (providing empirical data demonstrating the difficulty 
individuals experience exercising their HIPAA access rights); see also Keating, supra note 27 
(chronicling the difficulty obtaining access to one’s own genomic test results from research); K. 
McGowan, The Man Who Dissected His Own Brain, WIRED (Feb. 11, 2016, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/2016/02/the-man-who-dissected-his-own-brain/ (interviewing Keating) 
[https://perma.cc/TB82-C8FL]. 
 259. CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 7290, 7290 (Feb. 6, 2014) (to 
be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 493, 45 C.F.R. pt. 164). 
 260. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-416, CLINICAL LAB QUALITY: CMS 
AND SURVEY ORGANIZATION OVERSIGHT SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED (2006). 
 261. See id. at 33. 
 262. Id. at 52. 
 263. Id. 
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generally,”264 suggesting an ethos that federal laws can be ignored if 
expert option disfavors them.  
The current situation with HIPAA access evokes the pattern GAO 
observed. With its “brief, undated” PDF file, CMS effectively granted 
research laboratories a “needed respite”265 from a burdensome federal 
law—HIPAA’s laboratory access right—on which researchers, 
laboratories, and experts are “divided,”266 as the Academies’ Report 
shows.267 Research participants had no say in whether they wanted a 
“respite”268 from their federally protected privacy rights. Finally, CMS 
did not follow the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA)269 notice-and-
comment rulemaking procedures270 or even its guidance publication 
requirements271 when posting its PDF file, which denied research 
participants a chance to protest as their newly created access rights were, 
in practical effect, rescinded.  
B.  CMS’s Recent Position  
The PDF file summarizes CLIA’s research exception in the following 
manner:   
Depending on the circumstances, research testing can be 
either excepted from CLIA or subject to CLIA. Specifically, 
testing facilities may qualify to be excepted from CLIA 
certification if they meet the description of “research 
laboratories” provided by the CLIA regulation at 42 C.F.R. 
§ 493.3(b)(2). In accordance with that regulation, only those 
facilities performing research testing on human specimens 
that do not report patient-specific results may qualify to 
be excepted from CLIA certification.272 
However, the regulatory text of CLIA’s research exception at 42 
C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2) actually says:  
 (b) Exception. These rules [the CLIA regulations] do not 
                                                                                                                 
 264. Id. at 34.  
 265. Id. at 52. 
 266. Id. at 34.  
 267. See supra notes 248–50 and accompanying text. 
 268. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 262 at 52. 
 269. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 551–59, 701–06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (2012)). 
 270. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c).  
 271. See id. § 553(b)(3)(A) (providing an exception to the APA’s notice-and-comment 
requirement for interpretive rules/guidance documents). But see id. § 552(a)(1)(D) (requiring 
interpretative rules to be published in the Federal Register).  
 272. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 74. 
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apply to components or functions of . . .  
 (2) Research laboratories that test human specimens but do 
not report patient specific results for the diagnosis, 
prevention or treatment of any disease or impairment of, or 
the assessment of the health of individual patients . . . .273 
The PDF file interprets this regulation as if it had a period after the 
phrase “patient specific results,” so that the twenty-one-word clause 
appearing after that phrase is inoperant and, in effect, deleted. The PDF 
file explains this deletion by noting:  
In most cases, research testing where patient-specific 
results are reported from the laboratory, and those results 
will or could be used “for the diagnosis, prevention, or 
treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the assessment 
of the health of, human beings” are presumed to be subject 
to CLIA, absent evidence to the contrary.274  
This explanation interprets CLIA’s research exception as giving rise 
to a rebuttable presumption that any patient-specific results that a 
laboratory reports “will or could be” misused for a clinical purpose, with 
the laboratory bearing the burden of proof to rebut the presumption with 
contrary evidence. The CLIA regulation creates no such presumption or 
burden of proof, nor does the CLIA statute.275 In a 2017 public statement, 
a CMS official went farther and suggested that the PDF file’s 
presumption that all research laboratory reporting is for a clinical purpose 
is irrebuttable:  
CLIA applies when. . .  
Patient specific results are reported from the laboratory to 
another entity and the results are available and can be used 
for health care for individual patients.  
In general, when patient-specific results are reported from 
the laboratory, it is assumed that they will or could be used 
for patient care purposes; therefore, they are subject to 
CLIA.276  
The PDF file—and the above statement—do not merely “interpret” 
the CLIA regulation; they revise it. An example demonstrates the point: 
                                                                                                                 
 273. 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2) (2018). 
 274. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 74. 
 275. See supra text accompanying Part III, fig.1. 
 276. Karen Dryer, Return of Genetic Results in the All of Us Research Program (Day 2), 
NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (Mar. 7, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://videocast.nih.gov/summary.asp?Live 
=21887&bhcp=1 (1:16:55). 
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Suppose a law says, “Motor vehicles can be impounded if they are driven 
for commission of a felony.”  The agency responsible for enforcing this 
law publishes a written policy statement interpreting this as saying, 
“Motor vehicles can be impounded if they are driven.” In a public speech, 
an agency official justifies this policy by noting, “In general, when motor 
vehicles are driven, it is assumed that they will or could be used for 
commission of a felony; therefore, they are subject to being impounded.” 
That is not an interpretation of the law; it is a material change of law. 
C.  Does CMS’s Position Merit Deference? 
When an agency interprets its own regulations, courts generally grant 
it the highest level of deference, variously called  Seminole deference, 
after the 1945 case, Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,277 or Auer 
deference for a later case that explained it well.278 Some scholars view 
Auer deference as being even stronger than the Chevron deference 
agencies often receive when interpreting statutes.279 The rationale for the 
heightened deference is that the agency that originally wrote a regulation 
is particularly well qualified to interpret its meaning.280 
Under Auer, courts would treat an agency’s interpretation of its 
regulation as controlling unless that view is “plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation”281 or violates a statute or the 
Constitution.282 The PDF file, as just described, is inconsistent with the 
text of the regulation it purports to interpret.283 As the HHS Secretary’s 
Advisory Committee on Human Research Protections (SACHRP) noted 
in its own analysis of the situation, CMS’s position “seems at odds with 
the plain language of the regulation, which prohibits performing a non-
CLIA-certified laboratory test for purposes of diagnosing or treating a 
                                                                                                                 
 277. 325 U.S. 410 (1945). Seminole Rock was cited and followed more recently in Auer v. 
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). 
 278. See, e.g., Conor Clarke, Note, The Uneasy Case Against Auer and Seminole Rock, 33 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 175, 175 (2015). 
 279. See Hanah Metchis Volokh, The Anti-Parroting Canon, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 290, 
292 n.5 (2011) (citing scholars who hold this view, but noting that it is not universally held). 
 280. Id. at 291. 
 281. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley 
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)). 
 282. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993) (“As we have often stated, provided an 
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations does not violate the Constitution or a federal statute, 
it must be given ‘controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.’” (quoting Bowles, 325 U.S. at 410)); see also 1 PIERCE, supra note 82, § 6.4, at 439 
(“Stinson is consistent with many opinions issued both before and after Stinson.”). 
 283. 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2) (2018). 
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person, but does not prohibit data releases required by law or for other 
purposes.”284 This inconsistency precludes Auer deference.  
If that were not enough, an additional exception to Auer deference is 
pertinent. The 2006 case of Gonzales v. Oregon285 recognized an 
exception to Auer deference when an agency is interpreting a regulation 
that simply parrots, or incorporates, statutory language.286 The rationale 
for Auer deference—that the agency is interpreting regulatory language 
that the agency itself wrote—breaks down when an agency interprets 
statutory language written by Congress. In this situation, the interpretive 
question is “not the meaning of the regulation but the meaning of the 
statute”287 that the regulation copies. The appropriate level of deference 
would ordinarily be Chevron, but because the PDF was not generated 
through a notice-and-comment proceeding, the lesser deference 
described in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,288 or Skidmore deference, is 
warranted.289  
CMS’s 2014 PDF file falls squarely in this latter exception to Auer 
deference. The PDF file discusses regulatory language drawn verbatim 
from the CLIA statute. In one place, it mentions the phrase, “for the 
diagnosis, prevention or treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the 
assessment of the health of individual patients” that appears in the CLIA 
research exception. Yet the PDF file eliminates this phrase when it states 
that “only those facilities performing research testing on human 
specimens that do not report patient-specific results may qualify to be 
excepted from CLIA certification.”290 The phrase in question came 
directly from the CLIA statute; it is not CMS’s language to toss away.  
Because CMS published the PDF file without notice-and-comment 
procedures, its interpretation of this statutory language is only eligible for 
Skidmore deference.291 Under Skidmore, the PDF file would receive 
                                                                                                                 
 284. See Sec’y’s Advisory Comm. on Human Research Prots., supra note 81. 
 285. 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
 286. Id. at 256–58; see Volokh, supra note 279, at 292 (discussing this so-called “anti-
parroting canon”); see also 1 PIERCE, supra note 82, at § 6.11, 527–29 (“The Gonzales majority 
recognized that the rule the agency purported to interpret was not literally a parroting rule.”).  
 287. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 257. 
 288. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).  
 289. See id. at 140 (“The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon 
the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with 
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking 
power to control.”). See generally United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (addressing 
the applicability of judicial deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council to statements agencies make during notice-and-comment rulemaking and in less formal 
settings). 
 290. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 74.  
 291. See 1 PIERCE, supra note 82, § 6.4, at 435 (noting that “the Chevron test does not apply 
to interpretive rules” that are exempt from the notice and comment procedure of APA § 553). 
1326 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71 
 
respect proportional to its “power to persuade”292 and courts would 
consider the thoroughness, logic, and expertness of the agency’s 
interpretation when deciding whether to defer to it.293 The PDF file offers 
no discussion or explanation of why it is inconsistent with the statute it 
purports to interpret. Its silence is thuddingly unpersuasive.  
Moreover, CMS’s position does not reflect a “fair and considered 
judgment on the matter in question,” which Justice Scalia once argued 
(albeit in a dissent) should warrant Chevron deference regardless of 
whether an agency followed notice-and-comment procedures.294 Far 
from being a “considered judgment,” CMS’s December 2014 PDF file 
was a hasty flip-flop reversing a position CMS took ten months earlier 
when it promulgated the final rule expanding HIPAA’s access right. 
Moreover, the PDF file contradicts the longstanding HCFA interpretation 
announced in the original 1992 CLIA rulemaking.295  
Finally, the inconsistency between the PDF file and the CLIA statute 
goes to a matter of special sensitivity: the scope of CMS’s jurisdiction to 
regulate research laboratories. Congress, by statute, placed a limiting 
condition on CMS’s jurisdiction: CMS can regulate research laboratories 
only if they provide information “for the diagnosis, prevention, or 
treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the assessment of the health 
of, human beings.”296 The PDF file assumes that a research laboratory 
that reports results for any use is doing so for clinical use, because the 
results “could be” misused by third parties downstream of the point when 
the laboratory reports them to the individual.297 The surplusage canon of 
textual construction favors the view that every word of a statute or 
regulation should be treated as operant, with none ignored.298 As one 
justice put it, “These words cannot be meaningless, else they would not 
have been used.”299 The PDF file treats Congress’s scienter requirement 
as functionally meaningless. 
CMS’s position ignores the limiting condition Congress placed on 
CMS’s jurisdiction, by assuming that condition to be met absent evidence 
to the contrary. Assuming it to be met removes a crucial constraint that 
Congress imposed on CMS’s authority to regulate research laboratories. 
Eskridge and Baer, in their empirical study of case outcomes, found that 
courts look more harshly on agency statements when the agency “is 
                                                                                                                 
 292. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
 293. Id.  
 294. 1 PIERCE, supra note 82, § 6.4, at 436. 
 295. See supra Part III. 
 296. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a) (2012); 42 C.F.R. § 493.2 (2018). 
 297. See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 74. 
 298. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 197, at 174. 
 299. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936). 
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interpreting its own jurisdiction or authority” rather than statements in 
which an “agency applies its regulations to a matter of detail, [and] is not 
interpreting its own jurisdiction or regulatory authority.”300 This again 
counsels that CMS’s current view of its jurisdiction to regulate research 
laboratories is suspect.  
CMS’s PDF file does not go to a matter of detail. It reflects an agency 
significantly expanding its jurisdiction and doing so “on the sly”301 by 
posting an undated PDF file instead of acting openly and transparently 
through appropriate APA notice-and-comment procedures.302 Note, 
however, that even if CMS had followed APA rulemaking procedures, 
agencies cannot do what the PDF file attempts to do. Even with APA 
rulemaking, agencies cannot amend federal statutes, which only 
Congress can do. 
The position stated in the PDF file does not merit Auer deference. In 
fact, the PDF attempts to assert regulatory authority over research 
laboratories that Congress never granted the agency. The Report’s SOT, 
and the Report itself, erred by assuming the PDF reflects current law.  
V.  ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTIONS PRODUCE FLAWED RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Report bases a sweeping legal reform agenda on an assumption 
that two federal regulations—the HIPAA Privacy Rule and the CLIA 
regulations—are in conflict, so that non-CLIA research laboratories 
cannot provide HIPAA access to individual-specific data without 
becoming subject to CLIA.303 The Report further assumes that 
researchers cannot return results from non-CLIA labs without risking the 
same violation. A basic legal analysis would have proved these 
assumptions wrong.  
A.  The Report’s Flawed Assumptions  
Complying with HIPAA’s access right causes a HIPAA-regulated 
research laboratory to fall under CLIA only if the laboratory does so 
                                                                                                                 
 300. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme 
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 
1083, 1130 (2008). 
 301. Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and 
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(1992). 
 302. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2012). 
 303. See REPORT, supra note 10, at 250 tbl.6-2 (stating that a non-CLIA-certified laboratory 
has a legal obligation to make “[m]andatory disclosure under HIPAA (but act of disclosure then 
requires laboratory to become CLIA-certified)”—in other words, the required act of providing 
access to data under HIPAA will trigger CLIA jurisdiction for laboratories that would not 
otherwise be subject to the CLIA regulation). 
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intending to provide data for clinical use.304 A research laboratory 
reporting data pursuant to a HIPAA access request has intent, first of all, 
to comply with federal privacy law and, secondarily, to promote the 
legislative and regulatory objectives the Privacy Rule serves.305 A 
research laboratory providing information for HIPAA-compliance 
purposes lacks the scienter—intent to provide data for clinical use—that 
gives rise to CLIA jurisdiction. If a research laboratory is not otherwise 
subject to CLIA, the mere act of providing HIPAA access will not cause 
the laboratory to fall under CLIA.  
Similarly, the mere act of returning research results and data will not 
trigger the need for CLIA compliance. What matters is the laboratory’s 
purpose in reporting those results and data. If the purpose is to produce 
results and data for direct use in diagnosis, prevention, treatment, or 
health assessment, then CLIA is triggered. However, if the laboratory is 
not providing results and data for these purposes, but as part of the ethical 
conduct of research, CLIA is not triggered and the CLIA research 
exception applies.  
Congress recognized, as it passed the 1967 CLIA statute, that research 
activities may or may not cause a laboratory to fall under CLIA. Congress 
intended for CLIA not to cover “laboratories engaged in research where 
examination of specimens is directed toward that end” but wanted CLIA 
to cover research laboratories where testing was directed at “treatment of 
patients.”306 In some research, especially clinical research,307 laboratories 
are generating results to be directly used in clinical care and use of a 
CLIA-compliant laboratory is necessary. However, in other research, the 
laboratory results are not intended for direct use in clinical care.   
Over the past two decades, researchers have worked in close 
collaboration with ethicists and legal scholars to develop consensus 
guidelines to ensure appropriate return of results mindful of CLIA 
requirements.308 It is essential to understand how these guidelines work. 
They envision three scenarios, corresponding to three separate pathways 
for the return of results and data from research laboratories.   
In the first scenario, a laboratory generates a research result or data 
intending its direct use in clinical care without any further confirmatory 
                                                                                                                 
 304. See discussion supra Parts III & IV. 
 305. See discussion supra Part II. 
 306. 113 CONG. REC.  26,006 (1967) (statement of Rep. Harley O. Staggers).  
 307. See Wylie M. Burke et al., Return of Results: Ethical and Legal Distinctions Between 
Research and Clinical Care, 166C AM. J. MED. GENETICS PART C: SEMINARS MED. GENETICS 105, 
107 (2014) (explaining that the scope of clinical practice is a matter of state law, and that states 
generally do not regard it as clinical care to recommend that a person should seek clinical care or 
to make a referral to clinical care).     
 308. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.  
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testing at a CLIA-certified clinical laboratory. If this is the case, the 
research laboratory must comply with CLIA: the laboratory has the 
scienter that triggers CLIA regulation. Thus, the first pathway for return 
of results is simply to conduct research using a CLIA-compliant 
laboratory. That way, if any of the research results raise clinical concerns, 
they can be freely repurposed for clinical use without violating CLIA, 
because the research laboratory already complies with CLIA. This is a 
pathway many research laboratories follow.  
As the Academies’ Report notes, however, it is not practical or cost-
effective for all research laboratories to comply with CLIA.309 When a 
non-CLIA research laboratory encounters a finding that raises potential 
clinical concerns, there are two remaining options. The second pathway 
for returning results is for the laboratory to arrange confirmatory testing 
at a CLIA-compliant laboratory before returning the results.310 This 
second pathway is also widely recognized.311 It ensures that information 
ultimately returned is from a CLIA-compliant laboratory. Here again, 
there is no dispute that this pathway achieves appropriate CLIA 
compliance. The primary objection is that it entails incremental costs for 
the research laboratory, contributing to the perception that returning 
results diverts funds from the goals of the research.312  
Responsive to this concern, there is a third pathway—the clinical 
hand-off—which does not require confirmatory testing prior to return. 
Instead, the research laboratory advises the participant—or the 
participant’s physician, or both—that a research finding suggests a need 
for follow-up clinical testing and evaluation. The research laboratory is 
careful to communicate that the research finding is from a non-CLIA 
laboratory and requires clinical confirmation in a CLIA-compliant 
laboratory and clinical evaluation, and stresses that the research findings 
should not be used in clinical care without that confirmation and 
evaluation. The research laboratory carefully avoids rendering any 
diagnosis or making any treatment recommendations based on the 
research result, leaving that to the clinician.   
According to the CMS position, all three scenarios constitute a clinical 
use of research data, so the third scenario, which conveys research 
findings to trigger a CLIA-compliant clinical evaluation, violates CLIA. 
This is simply incorrect. As explained earlier,313 the CLIA statute and 
regulations defer to state law to define the scope of clinical care. State 
law recognizes a distinction between referring a patient for clinical care 
                                                                                                                 
 309. See REPORT, supra note 10, at 102–03. 
 310. See id. at 104. 
 311. See, e.g., id. at 104, 164. 
 312. See id. at 164. 
 313. See supra Part III. 
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and providing clinical care.314 Under state law, an activity is medical 
practice only if there is a provider–patient relationship and clinical care 
is taking place within the scope of that relationship.315 Physician–patient 
relationships are contractual in nature: “the express or implied consent of 
the physician is required” in order for a physician–patient relationship to 
come into being, and “the physician must take some affirmative action 
with regard to treatment of a patient for the relationship to be 
established.”316 Even assuming the researcher happens to be a physician, 
returning results for the narrow purpose of making a clinical referral does 
not involve the critical treatment step: “A physician-patient relationship 
is not established by the mere act of a physician agreeing to see a patient 
at a later time or suggesting that the patient contact another physician.”317 
Reporting a research result for the purpose of referring a person for 
clinical testing and evaluation is not itself a clinical use,318 and therefore 
does not give rise to CLIA compliance obligations.  
Thus the CLIA statute and regulations, properly understood, already 
allow all three pathways. It is the CMS PDF file that has gone off track. 
The agency—in effect—assumes that federalism does not exist and that 
CMS itself, rather than the states, has authority to decide what is and is 
not a clinical use of test results. That is incorrect. When promulgating the 
CLIA regulations,319 HCFA also expressed its intent “to allow States to 
determine who is authorized to order tests.”320 Congress has not 
authorized CMS to preempt state law in this area, and Congress certainly 
has not authorized CMS to preempt state law by posting informal PDF 
files.321 Under state law, it does not constitute clinical care for a non-
CLIA-compliant research laboratory to provide information for the 
purpose of recommending follow-up clinical testing.322 
                                                                                                                 
 314. See Burke et al., supra note 307. 
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(CLIA), 57 Fed. Reg. 7002, 7015 (Feb. 28, 1992) (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 
C.F.R.). 
 320. See id. at 7013. 
 321. See id. 
 322. See 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, Etc. § 130 (2019).  
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B.  Recommendations on Data Privacy 
The Report assumes a HIPAA-CLIA regulatory conflict that does not 
exist and then proposes sweeping changes to the Privacy Rule to resolve 
the imagined conflict.323 Table 3 summarizes three of the Report’s 
recommendations that raise particular concerns.  
 
Table 3. Legally problematic privacy recommendations 
in the Academies’ Report324 
Rec. 12A “[T]he Office for Civil Rights (OCR) of the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) should 
define the DRS to include only individual research results 
generated in a CLIA-certified laboratory or under the 
externally accountable quality management system for 
research laboratories (see Recommendation 2).”325 
Rec. 12B “OCR should require all HIPAA-covered entities that 
conduct research on human biospecimens to develop a 
plan that is reviewed and approved by the IRB for the 
release of individual research results in the designated 
record set to participants in a responsive manner when 
required under HIPAA.”326 
Rec. 12C “CMS should revise CLIA regulations such that when 
there is a legal obligation under the HIPAA access right to 
return individual research results, a laboratory will not be 
considered in violation of CLIA and need not obtain CLIA 
certification before satisfying this legal obligation.”327 
 
The Report’s Recommendation 12C is that “CMS should revise CLIA 
regulations such that when there is a legal obligation under the HIPAA 
access right to return individual research results, a laboratory will not be 
considered in violation of CLIA and need not obtain CLIA certification 
before satisfying this legal obligation”328 This recommendation strangely 
calls for CMS to amend the CLIA regulation to make the regulation say 
what it currently already says. A more appropriate recommendation 
would be for CMS to revise its PDF file to bring it into harmony with 
CMS’s existing CLIA regulations and with the CLIA statute.329  
                                                                                                                 
 323. See REPORT, supra note 10, at 1–2, 267.  
 324. Id. at 267. 
 325. Id. at 30, 267. 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. at 267. 
 329. Although the Report ends up criticizing “[t]he current absolute prohibition on the return 
of research results from non-CLIA-certified laboratories,” it presumes this prohibition to reflect 
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Recommendation 12B suggests that “OCR should require all HIPAA-
covered entities that conduct research on human biospecimens to develop 
a plan that is reviewed and approved by the IRB for the release of 
individual research results in the designated record set to participants in 
a responsive manner when required under HIPAA.”330 This would 
embroil IRBs in administering the Privacy Rule and would mark a major, 
fundamental change to Congress’s overall scheme of federal privacy 
enforcement, which relies on administrative enforcement by OCR rather 
than on IRBs.331 HIPAA access is a legally enforceable privacy right, 
with only narrow grounds for a covered entity to deny a person’s request 
for HIPAA access.332 HHS has stated that it intends for covered entities 
to invoke these access exceptions “rarely, if at all.”333 IRBs are often 
staffed by personnel who work for the research institution that is storing 
people’s data and may prefer not to release it to them. The Academies’ 
Report emphasizes that many institutions view HIPAA’s privacy 
protections as costly and burdensome.334 Recommendation 12B takes a 
vested federal legal right and reduces it to a right that can be denied, on a 
case-by-case basis, based on ethical review by potentially conflicted 
private actors. A legal right so restricted is no longer a legal right.  
Recommendation 12B also is at odds with the 2017 Common Rule 
revisions335 effective in January 2019.336 A major goal of the 2017 
Common Rule revisions was to disentangle research safety regulation 
from data privacy regulation.337  The revised Common Rule focuses IRB 
                                                                                                                 
the current regulations and recommends changing the regulations to eliminate the assumed, but 
non-existent, prohibition. Id. at 248. 
 330. Id. at 267. 
 331. See discussion supra Part II. 
 332. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(2)–(3) (describing non-reviewable and reviewable grounds 
for denial of access). 
 333. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed. Reg. 
59,918, 59,980–82 (Nov. 3, 1999) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (discussing 
exceptions to HIPAA’s access right in the 1999 preamble to the proposed Privacy Rule). 
 334. See REPORT, supra note 10, at 249. 
 335. See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149 (Jan. 19, 
2017) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46). 
 336. See also Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects: Delay of the Revisions 
to the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 83 Fed. Reg. 2885, 2885 (Jan. 22, 
2018) (extending the effective date of the new Common Rule until July 19, 2018); Federal Policy 
for the Protection of Human Subjects: Six Month Delay of the General Compliance Date of 
Revisions While Allowing the Use of Three Burden-Reducing Provisions During the Delay 
Period, 83 Fed. Reg. 28,497, 28,497 (June 19, 2018) (further delaying implementation until Jan. 
21, 2019). 
 337. See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. at 7151.  
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oversight on the physical risks of research.338 The Common Rule—and 
its IRBs—no longer will provide oversight for HIPAA-regulated uses and 
disclosures of data for research, public health, and health-care 
operations.339 This is to avoid duplication in cases where data privacy is 
already protected by HIPAA.340 HHS devoted more than six years of 
rulemaking effort to reduce IRBs’ role in privacy oversight, for which 
HHS considers IRBs poorly qualified.341 The Academies’ Report 
recommends upending that effort and embroiling IRBs in administering 
the HIPAA Privacy Rule342—a role they have neither the time nor the 
special knowledge to fulfill.   
Recommendation 12A is surpassingly problematic from a legal 
standpoint. It states that “the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) of the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) should define the DRS  
to include only individual research results generated in a CLIA-certified 
                                                                                                                 
 338. See, e.g., Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research 
Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,512, 
44,514 (July 26, 2011) (to be codified in scattered sections of 21 and 45 C.F.R.) (discussing the 
benefits of reducing Common Rule oversight of privacy risks in HIPAA-regulated informational 
research); Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 80 Fed. Reg. 53,933, 53,938 
(Sept. 8, 2015) (same). 
 339. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. at 7261–62. This 
regulation adopted a new provision at 46.104(d)(4)(iii) of the Code of Federal Regulations, which 
provided:   
Except as described in paragraph (a) of this section, the following categories of 
human subjects research are exempt from this policy: . . . (4) Secondary research 
. . . (iii) The research involves only information collection and analysis involving 
the investigator’s use of identifiable health information when that use is regulated 
under 45 CFR parts 160 and 164, subparts A and E, for the purposes of ‘health 
care operations’ or ‘research’ as those terms are defined at 45 CFR 164.501 or 
for ‘public health activities and purposes’ as described under 45 CFR 
164.512(b) . . . .” 
Id.   
 340. See id. at 7194 (“HIPAA also provides protections in the research context for the 
information that would be subject to this exemption (e.g., clinical records), such that additional 
Common Rule requirements for consent should be unnecessary in those contexts. . . . This 
provision introduces a clearer distinction between when the Common Rule and the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule apply to research in order to avoid duplication of regulatory burden. We believe that 
the HIPAA protections are adequate for this type of research, and that it is unduly burdensome 
and confusing to require applying the protections of both HIPAA and an additional set of 
protections.”). 
 341. See Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research 
Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. at 44,516 
(“IRB review or oversight of research posing informational risks may not be the best way to 
minimize the informational risks associated with data on human subjects. It is not clear that 
members have appropriate expertise regarding data protections.”). 
 342. See REPORT, supra note 10, at 267. 
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laboratory or under the externally accountable quality management 
system for research laboratories (see Recommendation 2).”343 This 
recommendation calls on OCR to violate three federal statutes: GINA’s 
privacy provisions344 and sections of the Public Health Service Act345 and 
the Social Security Act346 that GINA introduced. Recommendation 12A, 
in effect, is a call for Congress to repeal the genetic privacy protections 
that Congress mandated under GINA. It calls on OCR to take steps that 
are unlawful, unless the statutes are repealed. 
It is unclear how the Academies got into this awkward position. The 
Academies’ Report included an appendix that discusses GINA’s 
antidiscrimination provisions347—a puzzling inclusion in a report about 
giving people their own data, because people do not discriminate against 
themselves. The Report never discussed GINA’s privacy provisions, 
which were highly pertinent to the Report’s subject matter because they 
shaped today’s HIPAA access right.348 By enacting GINA, Congress 
recognized that storing genetic information can place people’s privacy 
and civil rights at risk even if the information is uncertain or lacks clinical 
significance. The Public Health Service Act, as amended by GINA, 
defines “genetic information” very broadly as including all information 
and raw data from genetic tests conducted on an individual or the 
individual’s family members, including from tests conducted in research 
settings.349 This definition indisputably includes non-clinically-
                                                                                                                 
 343. Id. at 269. 
 344. See Pub. L. No. 110-223, §§ 102, 105, 122 Stat. 881 (2008).     
 345. Pub. L. No. 78-410, 58 Stat. 682 (1944) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201–
300mm-61 (2012)).  
 346. Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301–
1397mm).  
 347. REPORT, supra note 10, app. at 333–37. 
 348. See discussion infra Section V.B.  
 349. See Pub. L. No. 110-223, § 102, 122 Stat. 881 (amending the Public Health Service Act 
at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(d)(16) to define “genetic information” very broadly as including “with 
respect to any individual, information about – (i) such individual’s genetic tests, (ii) the genetic 
tests of family members of such individual, and (iii) the manifestation of a disease or disorder in 
family members of such individual” and further including “genetic services, [and] 
participation . . . [in] genetic [research]”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(d)(17)(A) (2012) 
(defining “genetic test” as “mean[ing] an analysis of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins, 
or metabolites, that detects genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes” and thus clearly 
including non-clinically-significant information, such as raw genomic data, within the scope of 
information included in GINA’s definition of “genomic information); id. § 300gg-91(d)(18) 
(defining “genetic services” as including “genetic test[s]” and “genetic counseling (including 
obtaining, interpreting, or assessing genetic information)” and “genetic education,” such that 
information from testing, assessing, and counseling occurring during the course of genetic 
research is included in GINA’s broad definition of “genetic information.”).  
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significant test results and raw data in addition to clinically significant 
findings.350  
GINA’s Section 105 ordered HHS to place all such information under 
HIPAA’s privacy protections and amended the Social Security Act to 
include a Congressional mandate that genetic information, as defined by 
GINA’s broad definition, “shall be treated as health information”  for 
purposes of the HIPAA Privacy Rule.351 Thus, Congress deemed non-
clinically-significant genetic information and data to be “health 
information” for purposes of receiving protection under the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule, even though such information and data might not be 
regarded as “health information” in other legal contexts such as Medicare 
billing or state medical practice regulations.  
Recommendation 12A seeks to reverse GINA’s mandate to place all 
“genetic information,” as defined by the Public Health Service Act, under 
HIPAA’s privacy protections, which include HIPAA’s access right. This 
is not something OCR can do through regulations. Only Congress could 
make such a change, which seems unlikely.  GINA is recent legislation—
from 2008—passed by overwhelming margins in both houses of 
Congress; GINA passed the Senate by a vote of 95-0352 and the House by 
a vote of 414-1.353 Discussion in the Senate and House before those votes 
confirms that Congress viewed GINA’s privacy provisions as an 
important element of the overall legislation.354 This dispels any 
suggestion that Congress somehow passed GINA’s privacy provisions 
inadvertently in the course of enacting GINA’s larger antidiscrimination 
                                                                                                                 
 350. See Pub. L. No. 110-223, § 102, 122 Stat. 881. 
 351. See id. § 105 (adding a new § 1180 to the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-9, 
providing that “[t]he Secretary shall revise the HIPAA privacy regulation” so that “[g]enetic 
information shall be treated as health information described in section 1320d(4)(B),” which was 
the section of the Social Security Act added by the 1996 HIPAA statute in which Congress defined 
the “health information” that is subject to HIPAA’s privacy protections).    
 352. 154 CONG. REC. 6841 (2008). 
 353. Id.  
 354. See 154 CONG. REC. 6831 (2008) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (noting the dangers of 
genetic privacy violations and presenting evidence that “72 percent of Americans think laws are 
needed to protect genetic privacy”); id. at 6832 (statement of Sen. Enzi) (noting the importance 
of both privacy and data security protections); id. at 6834 (statement of Sen. Snowe) (noting that 
the HIPAA regulations offer a framework for communication of information); see also id. at 7516 
(statement of Rep. Miller) (emphasizing that Title I of GINA not only prevents discrimination in 
health insurance based on genetic information but “also protects the privacy of this personal 
information”); id. at 7517 (statement of Rep. Langevin) (“[T]he importance of . . . safeguarding 
the right to privacy cannot be overstated.”); id. at 7518 (statement of Rep. Speier) (stating that the 
passage of GINA “is a strong step toward protecting sensitive genetic information, but no journey 
is completed in just one step” and calling for further work to “address[] the underlying problems 
not fixed by this bill so we can truly protect Americans’ privacy”). 
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package.355 After the House and Senate voted to enact GINA, the statute 
has continued to enjoy strong bipartisan support. President George W. 
Bush signed GINA into law in 2008,356 and the Obama administration 
labored from 2009 to 2014 to craft regulations to implement GINA’s 
genetic privacy mandate, including an individual right of access to 
genetic information held at HIPAA-covered laboratories. 
Recommendation 12A asks OCR to ignore this mandate. 
A final problem is that the Report ignores HIPAA’s interaction with 
state privacy laws. The HIPAA Privacy Rule sets a federal floor of 
medical and genetic privacy protections: state laws providing “more 
stringent” privacy protections are not preempted by HIPAA.357 HIPAA 
regards a state privacy law as “more stringent” if it grants individuals 
greater access to their own data than the Privacy Rule provides.358 Some 
states provide individual access rights as part of their privacy laws,359 and 
a few states have passed data-ownership laws360 which, under common 
law principles, seemingly imply an individual right of access to the 
owned res (the data).  
Weakening HIPAA’s access right—as the Academies’ Report 
recommends—would not necessarily liberate research laboratories from 
having to respond to individual access requests. Instead, it might increase 
the number of state access provisions that qualify as more stringent than 
HIPAA’s access right. This, in turn, could increase laboratories’ 
regulatory compliance burdens. Instead of a uniform, national regime of 
individual data access under HIPAA, laboratories might be forced to 
comply with a complex patchwork of un-preempted state access 
requirements. 
                                                                                                                 
 355. Moreover, even if Congress somehow enacted GINA’s privacy provisions by mistake, 
it is a well-settled canon of statutory construction that the enacted text of a statute determines the 
law, regardless of what legislators allegedly intended to do. See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra 
note 197, at 369–90; see also MICHAEL B.W. SINCLAIR, GUIDE TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
103 (2000) (“[O]ur legislatures speak only through their statutes; statutes are their only voice; 
statutes are law; extrinsic materials are not.”). 
 356. President Bush Signs the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 
NHGRI (Mar. 17, 2012), https://www.genome.gov/27026050/president-bush-signs-the-genetic-
information-nondiscrimination-act-of-2008 [https://perma.cc/M4A4-5H7C]. 
 357. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(b) (2018) (providing that the HIPAA Privacy Rule does not 
preempt state privacy laws that are “more stringent” than the Privacy Rule). 
 358. See id. at § 160.202 (defining “[m]ore stringent” as including state laws that “permit[] 
greater rights of access” than the Privacy Rule provides (emphasis omitted)). 
 359. See, e.g., California Consumer Privacy Act, 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. 3–4 (West).   
 360. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010(a)(2) (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-
1104.7(1)(a) (2018); FLA. STAT. § 760.40(2)(a) (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1(1) (2018). 
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C.  Recommendations on the Return of Results and Data 
Recommendations for return of research results have been published 
for twenty years, beginning with the recommendations of the 
presidentially appointed National Bioethics Advisory Commission in 
1999.361 Remarkably, the Academies’ Report fails to consider the full set 
of recommendations germane to its focus,362 return of results from 
research involving human biospecimens. Moreover, the Report 
mischaracterizes the recommendations already in print. In a particularly 
egregious example, the Report attempts to depict its work as a rejection 
of past recommendations and a new effort to prioritize what research 
participants value:  
In a notable departure from the approaches of past expert 
groups, the committee has chosen to deemphasize the 
respective influences of clinical and personal utility in 
decisions regarding the return of individual research results 
by focusing more inclusively on results that have “value to 
participants,” with the understanding that the value of a 
result from the perspective of the participant might entail 
either clinical utility or personal utility or both and may also 
arise from the result having personal meaning . . . .363  
This characterization of past expert reports is incorrect. Multiple past 
expert reports have emphasized the importance of assessing the value of 
a result from the perspective of the participant. For example, well-known 
recommendations produced by an NIH-supported project group state: 
We show respect for research participants’ objective welfare 
as well as their subjective interests by including [incidental 
findings] of likely health or reproductive importance to the 
                                                                                                                 
 361. See Section II.A.  
 362. Relevant consensus recommendations that the Academies’ Report fails to consider 
include, but are not limited to: NAT’L CANCER INST., NCI BEST PRACTICES FOR BIOSPECIMEN 
RESOURCES 38 (2016), https://biospecimens.cancer.gov/bestpractices/2016-NCIBestPractices.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VB52-4PNC]; Laura M. Beskow et al., Informed Consent for Population-Based 
Research Involving Genetics, 286 JAMA 2315 (2001); Caulfield et al., supra note 68; Ellen 
Wright Clayton et al., Informed Consent for Genetic Research on Stored Tissue Samples, 274 
JAMA 1786 (1995). This list does not include relevant guidelines from outside the United States, 
including from prominent international organizations. For discussion of international guidelines, 
see, for example, Bartha M. Knoppers et al., Return of Genetic Testing Results in the Era of 
Whole-Genome Sequencing, 16 NATURE REVS. GENETICS 553 (2015); Bartha M. Knoppers et al., 
The Emergence of an Ethical Duty to Disclose Genetic Research Results: International 
Perspectives, 14 EUR. J. HUM. GENET. 1170 (2006); M’an Zawati et al., Incidental Findings in 
Genomic Research: A Review of International Norms, 9:1 GENEDIT 1 (2011).  
 363. REPORT, supra note 10, at 151 (first emphasis added). 
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participant. . . .  
 . . . [W]e define “utility” to include information that a 
research participant is likely to find important, even if 
clinicians cannot use that information to alter the 
participant’s clinical course . . . . This rejects an approach to 
utility grounded solely in what a clinician would find 
useful.364  
Based on this inadequate analysis, the Report makes multiple 
recommendations on return of results that do not advance participants’ 
interests in access to results and data, but instead create roadblocks as 
well as raising serious legal problems. Three of the more problematic 
recommendations are shown in Table 4. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 364. Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings and Research Results in Biobanks, supra 
note 68, at 232 (emphasis added). Subsequently, Fabsitz et al., supra note 68, at 577–78, 
recommended that, “Investigators may choose to return individual genetic results to study 
participants if . . . [t]he investigator has concluded that the potential benefits of disclosure 
outweigh the risks from the participant’s perspective . . . .” Id. (second emphasis added). That 
paper explained, “Researchers may choose to return individual results related to reproductive 
risks, personal meaning or utility, or health risks . . . .” Id. at 578. A subsequent article drives the 
point home. See Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research, supra 
note 68, at 372 tbl.4 (showing that both Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings and Research 
Results in Biobanks, supra note 68, and Fabsitz et al., supra note 68, urged assessing value “from 
the participant’s perspective”); id. at 373 (“[T]he core question, as we suggested in our prior 
project’s article, is whether return offers strong net benefit from the contributor’s perspective.” 
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).  
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Table 4. A subset of problematic recommendations on  
return of results in the Academies’ Report365 
Rec. 2 NIH should lead an interagency effort . . . to develop an 
externally accountable quality management system for non-
CLIA-certified research laboratories testing human 
biospecimens.366 
Rec. 3 To provide confidence in the quality of research test results 
disclosed to participants, institutions and their IRBs should 
permit investigators to return individual research results if: 
A. testing is conducted in a CLIA-certified laboratory; or 
 B. results are not intended for clinical decision making in 
the study protocol . . . and testing is conducted under the 
externally accountable quality management system for 
research laboratories once established (see Recommendation 
2); or 
 C. results are not intended for clinical decision making in 
the study protocol . . . and the IRB determines that  
1. the probability of value to the participant is 
sufficiently high and the risks of harm are sufficiently 
low to warrant return; 
2. the quality of the laboratory analysis is sufficient 
to provide confidence in the result to be returned, as 
determined by a review process independent of the 
laboratory; and 
3. information will be provided to the participant(s) 
regarding limits on test validity and 
interpretation . . . .367 
Rec. 
12D 
CMS should revise CLIA regulations to allow research 
results to be returned from a non-CLIA-certified laboratory 
when they are not intended for clinical decision making in 
the study protocol . . . and the laboratory conducts its testing 
under the quality management system with external 
accountability or the IRB has approved the return of results 
(as described in Recommendation 3).368 
 
Taken together, these recommendations would have the effect of 
reducing the return of results below levels allowed under current ethical 
guidelines. Recommendation 2 calls on the NIH to lead an effort to 
develop a “quality management system,” or QMS, for “non-CLIA-
                                                                                                                 
 365. See REPORT, supra note 10, at 1–37 (summarizing all recommendations). 
 366. Id. at 17. 
 367. Id. at 17–19. 
 368. Id. at 30. 
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certified research laboratories testing human biospecimens.”369 The 
Report envisions the QMS would play a pivotal role in determining 
whether participants can receive return of results from non-CLIA-
compliant research laboratories.370  The Report’s Recommendation 3 thus 
urges that research results be returned only when generated by a CLIA-
compliant laboratory, produced by a laboratory that complies with a QMS 
that does not yet exist, or approved by an IRB.371 
The Report claims to champion return of results to research 
participants.372 Yet Recommendation 3 creates roadblocks to return from 
non-CLIA laboratories. The recommendation would allow return from a 
non-CLIA laboratory if the laboratory complies with the QMS or if the 
IRB approves the return (subject to various restrictions).373 This would 
have the practical effect of restricting return more narrowly than current 
consensus guidelines allow.374 Also, it conditions return on the success 
of future efforts to create the QMS, which is far from assured and may 
take years to complete, leaving return of results from non-CLIA research 
laboratories in limbo. Under current guidelines, a non-CLIA research 
laboratory can return results subject to pathways 2 and 3 discussed 
above—that is, by seeking confirmation of the results to be returned at a 
CLIA-certified lab, or by a clinical hand-off for clinical confirmation and 
evaluation.375 Moreover, it is lawful to return results and data from a non-
CLIA laboratory for non-clinical uses (such as to enable participants to 
contribute their data to other research studies). The Report suggests that 
these perfectly lawful and ethical current practices should be put on hold, 
pending implementation of the QMS or IRB approval “case-by-case.”376  
In addition to creating these practical roadblocks to return of results, 
the Report seeks to alter the law itself. Recommendation 12D calls on 
CMS to “revise the CLIA regulations to allow research results to be 
returned from a non-CLIA-certified laboratory” if it complies with the 
QMS or if an “IRB has approved the return of results (as described in 
Recommendation 3).”377 This recommendation presents a number of 
legal problems. 
                                                                                                                 
 369. Id. at 17. 
 370. Id. at 96–97. 
 371. Id. at 17–19. 
 372. See, e.g., id. at 10–11. 
 373. See id. at 17–19, 121–24.  
 374. Wolf & Evans, Return of Results, supra note 69; Wolf & Evans, Defending Return of 
Results, supra note 69. 
 375. See discussion supra Section V.A. 
 376. See REPORT, supra note 10, at 80–81. 
 377. Id. at 30. 
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The Report indicates that CLIA statutory amendments lay outside the 
committee’s statement of task.378 However, it would not be lawful for 
CMS to implement Recommendation 12D, unless Congress first amends 
the CLIA statute. CMS lacks the authority to impose requirements on 
research laboratories that are not currently subject to CLIA. Congress 
would need to amend CLIA’s jurisdictional provisions, in order for CMS 
to have such authority.  
Moreover, CMS has no authority to rely on a QMS or IRB approval 
in circumstances in which CLIA compliance is already required. The 
QMS program in Recommendation 2 is in the nature of a “CLIA-Lite” 
program, designed to be less onerous for research laboratories than 
regular CLIA certification would be. The current CLIA statute does not 
recognize such an alternative: if a laboratory falls within CLIA’s 
jurisdiction, then the only way to comply with CLIA is to comply with 
CLIA. The CLIA statute envisions just two ways to comply: either obtain 
a CLIA certificate,379 or else meet the criteria to be CLIA-exempt.380 
CLIA exemption is only available to laboratories in certain states 
(currently New York and Washington) that have state licensing 
requirements that HHS has determined are equivalent to CLIA.381 
Recommendation 12D calls for CMS to create a new exemption for 
laboratories that comply with the QMS or follow the report’s IRB-review 
policies.382 CMS lacks statutory authority to create new exemptions from 
the CLIA statute’s compliance requirement. Only Congress can create 
new exemptions from CLIA’s requirement that CLIA-regulated 
laboratories must obtain a CLIA certificate. Once again, 
Recommendation 12D is not lawful without CLIA statutory amendments.  
When research laboratories do provide information intended for direct 
use in clinical care without further confirmation, they need to comply 
with CLIA. CLIA-Lite compliance is insufficient to ensure patient safety 
in that scenario. Recommendation 12D would allow research laboratories 
to return research results, even for immediate use in clinical care, if they 
comply with the QMS system or obtain IRB approval. This would violate 
the current CLIA statute and set a lower standard of patient safety than is 
required in pathways 1-3 of the current guidelines (as all three of the 
                                                                                                                 
 378. Id. at 9 (noting that the committee that drafted the report “was not asked to make 
recommendations to Congress regarding changes to the CLIA law”). 
 379. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(b) (2012). 
 380. Id. § 263a(p)(2). 
 381. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., LIST OF EXEMPT STATES UNDER THE CLINICAL 
LABORATORY IMPROVEMENT AMENDMENTS (CLIA), https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-
Guidance/Legislation/CLIA/Downloads/ExemptStatesList.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PV2-33SK].  
 382. See REPORT, supra note 10, at 30, 267–68.  
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currently recognized pathways would generate CLIA-compliant results 
before those results were used in clinical care). 
Finally, the Report recommends that NIH lead development of the 
QMS.383 Yet this new quality system is envisioned as a massive effort to 
govern the conduct and quality of all research involving human 
biospecimens. The proposal reaches far beyond return of results and far 
beyond laboratories conducting NIH-funded research. The QMS and the 
Report’s recommended CLIA amendments would affect privately 
funded, commercial research laboratories as well as NIH-funded 
laboratories. However, the National Institutes of Health, which was a 
sponsor of the Report, is not the right entity to govern the laboratories 
whose research it funds plus competing laboratories in the private sector. 
NIH has an obvious conflict of interest. In addition, NIH has no authority 
under the current CLIA statute and regulatory scheme to govern the 
quality of private laboratories that receive no NIH funds and to apply a 
QMS as a condition of return of results. Finally, NIH is not the 
appropriate entity to govern consumer safety in laboratory practice, as 
NIH would ultimately bear the costs of imposing more stringent safety 
standards on its funded researchers. Congress has entrusted CMS to serve 
as the consumer-safety regulator. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite CMS’s menacing PDF file, some research laboratories have 
continued to respect the rights of research participants by providing 
HIPAA access and offering return of research results according to 
established ethical guidelines.384 This response has required three things: 
(1) an unwavering commitment to research participants’ rights and to 
strong data privacy protections; (2) courage; and (3) access to qualified 
legal counsel.  
Agency guidance documents, such as the PDF file, have no binding 
legal force independent of the regulations they interpret or implement.385 
                                                                                                                 
 383. See, e.g., id. at 17 (“NIH should lead an interagency effort including nongovernmental 
stake-holders to develop an externally accountable quality management system for non-CLIA-
certified research laboratories testing human biospecimens.”). 
 384. Id. app. at 318 (“[T]here is anecdotal evidence that institutional policies prohibiting the 
return of results generated by research laboratories are being overruled in some instances. For 
example, a qualitative interview study of 31 IRB professionals at six sites across the United States 
reported two cases in which research test results that could not be confirmed in CLIA-certified 
laboratories were nevertheless reported to individual research participants. . . . Although 
additional instances have been noted in the literature, the frequency with which these decisions 
are being made in practice is unclear.” (footnotes omitted)).   
 385. Seidenfeld, supra note 178, at 347 (“This [lack of independent legal force] means that 
a person who is alleged to have violated an agency’s regulatory law must be shown to have 
violated the underlying statute or legislative rule [i.e., regulation] that the agency is implementing; 
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A laboratory with qualified counsel would know that guidances are non-
binding and is likely to know when a guidance misstates the law, as the 
PDF file does. This does not imply, however, that such a laboratory will 
necessarily resist an erroneous agency position statement. A non-binding 
guidance often induces “grudging compliance, ‘even when the doubts as 
to the lawfulness of the [guidance] are substantial.’”386 The practical 
reality is that even a flawed guidance document “still establishes the law 
for all those unwilling to pay the expense, or suffer the ill-will of 
challenging the agency in court.”387 When this happens, the guidance is 
said to be “practically binding”388 even though it is not legally binding in 
the sense that the agency would be able to enforce it.389  
The practical binding effect of a flawed guidance, such as CMS’s PDF 
file, may be even more pronounced in the case of research laboratories, 
staffed by scientists without training in the law, who are driven by the 
quest for scientific truth and funded by grants that include no budget for 
legal counsel. Research laboratories may comply out of a mistaken belief 
that anything a regulator says must be the law.  
One of the most unfortunate aspects of the Academies’ Report is that 
it undercuts the reasoned positions of laboratories that have done their 
homework, analyzed the law, and courageously continued to honor 
research participants’ rights. The Academies’ Report has exacerbated the 
confusion in an already confused legal landscape by reciting CMS’s 
position as if it were legally correct and following instructions from the 
study sponsors “to include in its description of the current regulatory 
environment for the return of individual research results the CMS’s 
current interpretation of the scope and applicability of CLIA.”390 
We urge policymakers, investigators, and institutions to exercise 
extreme caution in implementing the regulatory recommendations of this 
Report. This Article has tried to fill some of the gaps in legal analysis that 
produced a set of flawed—and, in some cases, unlawful—
                                                                                                                 
it is not sufficient for the agency to demonstrate that the person violated [the guidance 
document].”). 
 386. Croston, supra note 178, at 387 (alteration in original) (quoting William Funk, A Primer 
on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1321, 1340 (2001)). 
 387. Mendelson, supra note 182, at 400 (quoting Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between 
Formal and Informal Modes of Administrative Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 159, 167 (2000)). 
 388. See Anthony, supra note 301, at 1315. 
 389. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[A]n 
agency’s [guidance document] can as a practical matter, have a binding effect. If an agency acts 
as if a document issued at headquarters is controlling in the field, if it treats the document in the 
same manner as it treats a legislative rule . . . [and] if it leads private parties . . . to believe that 
[the agency] will [apply the policy expressed in the document], then the agency’s document is for 
all practical purposes ‘binding.’”).  
 390. REPORT, supra note 10, at 9. 
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recommendations. Further case-specific legal due diligence is advisable 
before acting on the regulatory recommendations of this Report.  
The root causes of this problem included a flawed statement of task 
that misstated federal law and constrained the committee’s ability to 
conduct a thorough, complete, and professional legal analysis. This 
Report represents a rare deviation from the Academies’ usual, rigorous 
policies surrounding the preparation of reports. This Article strives to 
illuminate the root causes in the hope that shedding light on what 
happened might help keep it from happening again. Agreeing to abstain 
from analyzing a highly disputed position asserted by an agency 
sponsoring a committee report endangers the quality of the report, the 
persuasiveness of its recommendations, and ultimately the Academies’ 
reputation. Legal analysis, like medical and scientific analysis, demands 
rigor. In law, as in mathematics, Π does not equal 6.  
The harm of these recommendations extends beyond the narrow 
context—biomedical research—on which the Academies focused their 
Report. In an unbroken line starting with the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 
1970 and extending through GINA in 2008, Congress has consistently 
treated the individual right of access to one’s own data as a foundational 
civil right—a core privacy protection that enables people to exercise 
many other rights including some enjoying constitutional protection. By 
advancing a view that privacy rights can be discarded when they grow 
burdensome, costly, or detrimental to productivity, the National 
Academies’ Report sows confusion about what rights are and why they 
matter. This confusion, emanating from so respected a source, diminishes 
Americans’ privacy rights more generally. 
A recent article on the front page of the New York Times illustrated 
the pivotal importance of honoring rights of access to one’s personal 
information. The article discussed the plight of China’s Uighurs, 
subjected to unconsented genetic testing as a tool of social control:  
The authorities called it a free health check. Tahir Imin 
had his doubts. They drew blood from the 38-year-old 
Muslim, scanned his face, recorded his voice and took his 
fingerprints. They didn’t bother to check his heart or 
kidneys, and they rebuffed his request to see the results.  
“They said, ‘You don’t have the right to ask about 
this . . . .’”391 
Even in the United States, many individuals, after consenting to 
genomic research, still encounter barriers to seeing their test results and 
data. Like the Uighurs in China, they are frequently told, “You don’t have 
the right to ask about this.” Access to one’s own personal information is 
                                                                                                                 
 391. Wee, supra note 18.  
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an essential right protected by multiple statutes Congress has enacted 
since 1970. The recent Report of the National Academies undermined 
rights that are protected by American law and crucial to the ethical 
conduct of research.   
 
